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The 1983 Korean Air Lines Incident: Highlighting 
the Law of International Air Carrier Liability 
1. INTRODUCTION 
At approximately 3: 26 a.m. Japan Standard Time on September 1, 1983/ the 
pilot of a Soviet Sukhoi-15 interceptor fired a heat seeking air-to-air missile, 
striking within seconds a Korean Air Lines (KAL) Boeing 747 jumbo jet, which 
had been flying in Soviet airspace for over two and one-half hours.2 The missile 
exploded upon impact.3 The KAL jetliner plummeted approximately 34,000 
feet and crashed into the Sea of Japan, killing all 269 passengers and crew 
members aboard.4 
Among the passengers who died were sixty-one U.S. citizens." As of November 
1, 1984, survivors of passengers killed in the incident had filed approximately 
160 lawsuits in U.S. courts.6 Not all of the lawsuits named the same defendants.7 
Among the possible co-defendants are the u.S.S.R.,B South Korea,9 the United 
I. See TIME, Sept. 19, 1983, at 22-24 [hereinafter cited as TIME]. The actual time was between 
1826:20 Greenwich Mean Time (G.M.T.), Aug. 31, 1983, when the Soviet pilot announced, "I have 
executed the launch," and 1826:22 G.M.T., when the pilot revealed, "[t]he Target is destroyed." Id. at 
24. 
2. See id. at 22-24. Virtually all of the information available regarding the final hours of KAL Flight 
007 is derived from the transcript released by the U.S. government of the radio conversations between 
the Soviet fighter pilots involved in the incident and Soviet ground control. For a complete transcript of 
the Soviet air-to-ground radio transmissions, see N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1983, § I, at 14, col. I. These 
radio conversations were intercepted and taped by voice-activated recording devices operated by 
Japanese ground radar installations. TIME, supra note I, at 22. For a complete chronology of KAL Flight 
007 during the three hours before being shot down, see N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1983, § I, at 6, col. I. 
3. See TIME, supra note I, at 22-24. 
4. !d. at 12. 
5. THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 10, 1983, at 37. In addition to the United States, it is unclear how many 
other nations had citizens aboard KAL Flight 007. One report stated that citizens of sixteen nations 
were aboard. N.Y. Times, Sept. 9,1983, § I, at 10, col. 5. Other reports listed thirteen nations as having 
citizens aboard Flight 007, including Australia, Canada, Great Britain, Hong Kong, India, Italy, Japan, 
the Philippines, South Korea, Sweden, Taiwan, Thailand, and the United States. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, 
Sept. 3, 1983, § I, at 4, col. 6; N.Y: Times, Sept. 12, 1983, § I, at 10, col. 1. 
Among the U.S. casualties was Lawrence P. McDonald, a U.S. Congressman from Georgia and the 
archconservative chairman of the John Birch Society. N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1983, § I, at 6, col. I. 
Ironically, Representative McDonald was a self-avowed enemy of the Soviet Union and viewed military 
strength as "America's only hope to avert the destruction threatened by the international Communist 
conspiracy." I d. 
6. See In re KAL Disaster of September I, 1983, M.D.L. No. 565 Misc. 83-0345 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 17, 
1983). 
7.Id. 
8. The U.S.S.R., the nation which shot down the KAL jet, is an obvious defendant. In order to 
recover, a plaintiff would have to establish the illegality of the Soviet action in shooting down KAL 
Flight 007 under The Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, openedfor signature Dec. 7, 
1944,61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter cited as The Chicago Convention 
of 1944]. The Chicago Convention of 1944 governs the legality of a nation's use of force in bringing 
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down an intruding airliner. See generally id. arts. 1-42. The Chicago Convention of 1944 defines state 
aircraft as "[aJircraft used in military, customs and police services .... " !d. art. 3(b). Given the fact that 
the U.S.S.R. claims that KAL Bight 007 was indeed performing an espionage mission for the U.S. and 
South Korean governments, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6,1983, § I, at I, col. 4, it would be necessary to resolve 
in court whether KAL Flight 007 was indeed performing an espionage mission, and if so, whether such 
an activity transformed the plane's status from "civilian" to "military." For a discussion of the legality of 
shooting down intruding civilian airplanes, see Hughes, Aerial Intrusions by Civilian Airliners and the Use of 
Force, 45]. AIR L. & COM. 595 (1980). 
A threshold requirement prior to litigating on the merits, however, is to obtain jurisdiction over the 
Soviet Union in a court of competent jurisdiction. There are several possible forums in which to bring 
an action against the Soviet Union. None, however, are likely to grant jurisdiction. One such possible 
forum is a U.S. district court. It is likely that the U.S.S.R. would be able to dismiss the suit for lack of 
jurisdiction under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, as codified in the United States by the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (1976) [hereinafter cited as the FSIAJ. The 
FSIA codifies the well-accepted principle of international law that the courts of one state generally have 
no jurisdiction to entertain suits against another state for actions arising out of that state's public, 
non-commercial activities. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATiONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES §§ 65-72 (1965). Since the Soviet Union's action in shooting down an intruding aircraft 
is clearly a non-commercial state activity, a sovereign immunity defense by the U.S.S.R. would very 
likely succeed in dismissing the lawsuit. 
Another possible forum is the International Court of Justice (I.C.].) in The Hague. The Soviet Union, 
however, does not recognize the compulsory jurisdiction of the I.C.]. See 1981-82 I.C.].Y.B. 47 n.l, 
59-93 (1982). Accordingly, any suit against the U.S.S.R. in the I.e.]. would likely be dismissed by that 
tribunal for want of jurisdiction. There have been several previous aerial incidents in which the Soviet 
Union shot down U.S. military aircraft, yet refused to submit to the jurisdiction of the I.C.]. in a 
subsequent lawsuit. See, e.g., Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of United States of America 
(U.S. v. U.S.S.R.), 1954 I.C.]. 103 (Order of July 12); Aerial Incident of 7 October 1952 (U.S. v. 
U.S.S.R.), 1956 I.C.]. 9 (Order of Mar. 14); Aerial Incident of 4 September 1954 (U.S. v. U.S.S.R.), 1958 
I.C.]. 158 (Order of Dec. 9); Aerial Incident of 7 November 1954 (U.S. v. U.S.S.R.), 1959 I.C.]. 276 
(Order of Oct. 7). In each lawsuit, the I.C.]., at its own initiative, removed the suit from the list of 
pending cases before reaching the stage for written and oral procedures. 
For a case in which a Soviet-bloc nation shot down a civilian airliner yet refused to submit to the 
jurisdiction ofthe I.C.]., see Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 (U.S. v. Bulgaria), 1960 I.C.]. 146 (Order of 
May 30) (EI Al Israeli passenger airplane shot down by Bulgarian military jet fighters near Greco-
Bulgarian border, killing all 58 persons on board, including some Americans; case dismissed by the 
I.C.]. for lack of compulsory jurisdiction over Bulgaria). See generally Gross, Bulgaria Invokes the Conally 
Amendment, 56 AM.]. INT'L L. 357 (1962). 
A third possible forum in which to sue the U.S.S.R. is within the Soviet domestic legal system itself. 
Any suit brought against the U.S.S.R. in Soviet courts, however, would most likely be dismissed. 
Thus, survivors of passengers killed on KAL Flight 007 would be unlikely to obtain jurisdiction over 
the U.S.S.R. in any court of justice. It remains an outside possibility, however, that the United States, 
through appropriate diplomatic channels, might succeed in persuading the U.S.S.R. to offer on an ex 
gratia basis compensation to families of the victims of the KAL Flight 007 aerial incident. In fact, there is 
some precedent for the expectation that international diplomatic pressure could lead to compensation 
in aerial incidents involving Soviet-bloc nations. For example, when Yugoslavia shot down an unarmed 
military transport plane on August 19, 1946, the Yugoslav government later offered compensation, but 
on an ex gratia basis only. Hughes, supra , at 609. In another incident, Bulgaria made an ex gratia payment 
of $200,000 to the Israeli government after shooting down an Israeli EI Al passenger airliner in 1955. 
N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1983, § I, at 30, col. 4. Given Bulgaria's refusal to submit to the I.C.].'s jurisdiction 
and the small amount of the payment, this action is best interpreted as a goodwill gesture rather than as 
a good faith attempt to compensate fully the families of victims. 
9. South Korea is a possible defendant since the Soviet Union alleges that the South Korean 
government was conducting an espionage mission through the use of its national airline, KAL. N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 4,1983, § I, at 18, col. 5 (South Korean government dismisses Soviet allegations of spying, 
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States,10 Japan,l1 Boeing CO.,12 Litton Industries, Inc.,13 and KAL.14 This Com-
ment focuses exclusively, however, on the remedies available against KAL, the 
carrier involved in the incident, under applicable U.S. and international law. 
The law governing the liability of air carriers in international aviation inci-
dents has been the focus of extensive development and analysis, dating back to 
the infancy of the international aviation industry.15 Yet despite many years and 
repeated attempts to develop a workable and enforceable international standard, 
the law today remains more volatile and less uniform than ever.16 The KAL 
calling such claim "a flagrant lie"). It is Iik~ly, however, that South Korea would refuse to submit to the 
jurisdiction of a U.S. court by pleading the defense of sovereign immunity. See supra note 8. 
10. The United States is a possible defendant on four bases: (1) for allegedly using KAL Flight 007 
for intelligence-gathering purposes, N. Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1983, § I, at I, col. 4; (2) for recklessly 
endangering KAL Flight 007 by tailing the KALjet with its RC-135 military reconnaissance plane, 
under the theory that but for the RC-135's flying close to KAL Flight 007, the Soviets would not have 
mistaken the KAL Boeing 747 for the U.S. Air Force Boeing 707 and therefore would not have shot 
down Flight 007, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1983, § I, at I, col. 6; (3) for negligence in allegedly closely 
monitoring the progress of KAL Flight 007 through the use of U.S. listening devices but not alerting 
either the KAL pilot or the Soviet authorities of the intrusion, despite the fact that the United States was 
aware of the deviation ofKAL Flight 007 from its intended flight path, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8,1983, § I, at 
II, col. I; and (4) for remaining a party to an international convention limiting the liability of KAL to 
the survivors of passengers to such a severe extent that continued adherence to the convention's limit 
constitutes a "taking" under the fifth amendment to the U.S. Constitution, thereby permitting recovery 
from the United States under the Tucker Act, see infra note 94. See infra notes 89-103 and accompanying 
text (discussing issue of a "taking"). See also infra notes 17-88 and accompanying text (discussing the 
liability limitation provisions of the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Agreement). For an extensive 
analysis implicating the responsibility of the United States in the KAL Flight 007 incident, see Pearson, 
K.A.L. 007: What the U.S. Knew And When We Knew It, 239 NATION 105 (1984). 
II. Japan could be sued for allegedly tracking the progress of KAL Flight 007 with its radar 
installations and listening devices, yet failing to take any steps to avert the tragedy by alerting either the 
pilot, the United States, orthe U.S.S.R. N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1983, § I, at II, col. I. This is similarto the 
theory under which the United States could be sued. See supra note 10. 
12. Boeing Co., the builder of the KAL 747 jumbo jet which was shot down, is a possible defendant 
under a product liability theory. If Boeing should be found jointly liable with KAL, and ifthe Warsaw 
Convention as modified by the Montreal Agreement limits KAL's liability to $75,000, see infra notes 
72-88 and accompanying text, then Boeing's liability may far exceed $75,000 in order to fully compen-
sate the victims. See infra notes 350-59 and accompanying text (discussing risk-shifting). Thus Boeing, 
unlike KAL, might be subject to unlimited liability and therefore forced to bear a disproportionate 
share of the court's ultimate judgment. See, e.g., infra notes 358-59 and accompanying text (discussing 
fears of certain U.S. senators that an international agreement limiting the liability of air carriers in 
international aviation accidents may unfairly burden the manufacturers of aircraft and aircraft parts). 
13. Litton Industries, Inc., which manufactured the three computerized navigational systems aboard 
KAL's Boeing 747 jet, N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1983, § I, at 6, col. 5, is also a possible co-defendant. Since 
some newspaper reports have intimated that one possible explanation for KAL Flight 007's straying off 
course into Soviet airspace is a malfunction of the navigational equipment, N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1983, § 
I, at 4, col. I, Litton Industries may be wholly or jointly liable. See also Boston Globe, July 23, 1984, at 7, 
col. I. If indeed Litton is found jointly liable, then it may be subject to pay a disproportionate share of 
the total judgment since, unlike KAL, it is not entitled to limited liability. See infra notes 350-59 and 
accompanying text (discussing risk-shifting). 
14. See infra notes 368-97 and accompanying text. 
15. See generally Lowenfeld &: Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. 
REv. 497 (1967). 
16. See infra text accompanying notes 398-418. 
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incident serves both as an excellent case study to highlight the inadequacies of 
current law, and as a springboard to suggest ways to create a more acceptable, 
just, and uniform international aviation standard. 
This Comment first traces the history and development of the law of interna-
tional air carrier liability, from the Warsaw Convention in 1929 to the Montreal 
Agreement of 1966. The Comment then reviews recent judicial and legislative 
developments in the United States that, for a short time, seriously threatened 
continued U.S. participation in the international aviation system. The author 
then postulates what remedies are available, under the current state of the law, to 
the survivors of passengers killed in the KAL incident. Finally, the Comment sets 
forth some suggestions with respect to developing a new international standard 
that would be acceptable to both the United States and other nations, that would 
restore uniformity, and that would be in the best interests of U.S. citizens 
traveling abroad. 
II. INTERNATIONAL AIR CARRIER LIABILITY LAW: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Warsaw Convention 
A series of international treaties and agreements, beginning with the Warsaw 
Convention,17 has restricted compensation and awards of damages from air 
carriers in international aviation incidents. The Warsaw Convention is a multina-
tional agreement lS drafted with two goals in mind: first, to establish uniformity 
with respect to claims arising out of international aviation; 19 and second, to limit 
17. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, 
openedforsignature Oct. 12, 1929,49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876,137 L.N.T.S. II ,reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 
1502 app. at 1690-94 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Warsaw Convention]. The Warsaw Convention is the 
product of conferences held in Paris in 1925 and Warsaw in 1929. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn,supra note 
15, at 498. 
18. As of July 1976, 114 nations were parties to the Warsaw Convention, including: Afghanistan, 
Algeria, Argentina, Australia (including Norfolk Island), Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, 
Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Cameroon, Canada, China (People's Rep.), Colombia, Congo 
(Brazzaville), Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark (not including Greenland), Dominican Rep., 
Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France (including French colonies), Gabon, The Gambia, 
Germany (Oem. Rep.), Germany (Fed. Rep.), Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, 
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, I vory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Korea 
(Oem. Rep.), Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, 
Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands 
(including Cura(ao), New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, 
Philippines, Poland (including Free City of Danzig), Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa (including Southwest Africa), Spain (including 
colonies), Sri Lanka, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tan-
zania, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United 
Kingdom, United States, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Viet-Nam, Western Samoa, Yemen (Aden), Yugo-
slavia, Zaire, and Zambia. 3 Av. L. REP. (CCH) 11 27,054 (july 1976). 
19. The Warsaw Convention, in its introduction, states that it was designed to regulate "in a uniform 
manner the conditions of international transportation by air in respect of the documents used for such 
transportation and of the liability of the carrier." Warsaw Convention, supra note 17, preamble. 
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the potential liability of international air carriers in case of accident.20 
The Warsaw Convention contains several major provisions. It standardizes, 
among contracting nations, the documentation required for passengers and 
carg021 on international flights. 22 It also standardizes various procedural rules 
relating to claims for loss and damage.23 Finally, the Warsaw Convention limits 
the liability of air carriers in the event of accident causing death or injury to 
passengers, and in the event of loss of or damage to cargo.24 
The liability limitations of the Warsaw Convention are explicitly set forth in 
Article 22,25 which expresses the limitations in terms of the Poincare franc. 26 
Article 22 limits the liability of an air carrier for the death of or personal injury to 
20. Warsaw Convention, supra note 17, arts. 17-25. The drafters of the Convention considered the 
goal of limiting the potential liability of air carriers to be more important than the goal of establishing 
international uniformity with respect to claims procedures. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 15, 
at 498-99 n.9. 
21. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 17, arts. 3-4 (ticketing) and arts. 5-16 (waybills). 
22. The provisions of the Warsaw Convention apply only to "international transportation," which is 
defined as: 
any transportation in which, according to the contract made by the parties, the place of 
departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be a break in transportation or a 
transshipment, are situated either within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, or 
within the territory of a single High Contracting Party, if there is an agreed stopping place 
within a territory subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of another 
power, even though that power is not a party to this convention. Transportation without such 
an agreed stopping place between territories subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate, 
or authority of the same High Contracting Party shall not be deemed to be international for the 
purposes of this convention. 
!d. art. 1(2). 
23. See id. arts. 26-30. 
24. See id. arts. 17-25. 
25. Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention reads: 
(1) In the transportation of passengers the liability of the carrier for each passenger shall be 
limited to the sum of 125,000 francs. Where, in accordance with the law of the court to which 
the case is submitted, damages may be awarded in the form of periodical payments, the 
equivalent capital value of the said payments shall not exceed 125,000 francs. Nevertheless, by 
special contract, the carrier and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability. 
(2) In the transportation of checked baggage and of goods, the liability of the carrier shall be 
limited to a sum of 250 francs per kilogram, unless the consignor has made, at the time when 
the package was handed over to the carrier, a special declaration of the value at delivery and 
has paid a supplementary sum if the case so requires. In that case the carrier will be liable to 
pay a sum not exceeding the declared sum, unless he proves that that sum is greater than the 
actual value to the consignor at delivery. 
(3) As regards objects of which the passenger takes charge himself the liability of the carrier 
shall be limited to 5,000 francs per passenger. 
(4) The sums mentioned above shall be deemed to refer to the French franc consisting of 65 
112 milligrams of gold at the standard of fineness of nine hundred thousandths. These sums 
may be converted into any national currency in round figures. 
Warsaw Convention, supra note 17, art. 22. 
26. Article 22(4) of the Warsaw Convention defines the Poincar franc as a coin "consisting of 65 112 
milligrams of gold ... [which] may be converted into any national currency in round figures." Warsaw 
Convention,supra note 17, art. 22(4). Until the United States abandoned the gold standard in the 1970s, 
see infra notes 122-28 and accompanying text, the dollar value of the Poincar franc was calculated by 
converting the value of 65 112 milligrams of gold into U.S. dollars. 
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a passenger to 125,000 Poincare francs,27 or approximately $8300.28 The liability 
of an air carrier for loss of or damage to cargo is limited to 250 Poincare francs 
per kilogram,29 or approximately $9.07 per pound.30 
The liability limit for death of or personal injury to a passenger was considered 
low even in 1929,31 but the drafters of the Warsaw Convention adopted it in 
order to encourage the growth of international air travel.32 The drafters consid-
ered the protection afforded by a liability limitation to be essential to the survival 
of the then fledgling aviation industry. In the absence of any such liability 
limitation, the aviation industry faced the potentially ruinous alternatives of 
either exorbitant insurance premiums or debilitating damage suits in the event 
of a single catastrophic accident.33 
Although the Warsaw Convention's low liability limitation was a major conces-
sion to the airline industry,34 the passenger received as a quid pro quo the benefit 
of Article 20, which established negligence as the basis for liability.35 Rather than 
requiring the passenger to establish the carrier's negligence, however, Article 20 
shifted the burden of proof so that the carrier was presumed liable unless it 
established that it had "taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that 
it was impossible for [it] to take such measures."36 
An important additional concession which the Warsaw Convention gave to the 
27. Warsaw Convention, supra note 17, art. 22(1). 
28. The 125,000 Poincar franc liability limit was worth $8291.88 in 1965. In re Aircrash at Kimpo 
International Airport, Korea, on November 18, 1980, 558 F. Supp. 72, 73 (c.n. Cal. 1983). 
29. Warsaw Convention, supra note 17, art. 22(2). 
30. See CAB Order 74-1-16, 39 Fed. Reg. 1526 (1974) (implemented at 14 C.F.R. § 221.176 (1975». 
31. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 15, at 499. 
32. See id. at 499-500. 
33. See id. 
34. See id. at 500. 
35. Article 20 of the Warsaw Convention reads: 
(1) The carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his agents have taken all necessary 
measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for him or them to take such measures. 
(2) In the transportation of goods and baggage the carrier shall not be liable if he proves 
that the damage was occasioned by an error in piloting, in the handling of the aircraft, or in 
navigation and that, in all other respects, he and his agents have taken all necessary measures to 
avoid the damage. 
Warsaw Convention, supra note 17, art. 20 (emphasis added). 
36. Id. Today, however, the common law doctrine of res ipsa loquitur automatically shifts the burden 
of proof to the air carrier because of the difficulty in gathering proof of negligence in aviation accident 
cases. Comment, An Extension of the Warsaw Convention's Protection: Julius Young Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. 
Delta Airlines, 5 N.C.J. INT'L. L. & COM. REG. 497 n.l (1980) (citing Rhyne, International Law and Air 
Transportn.tion, 47 MICH. L. REv. 41, 54-61 (1948». Thus, Article 20's concession to the passenger, the 
shift in the burden of proof in exchange for the liability limit, has become superfluous.Id. See generally 
Hjalsted, The Air Ca,.,ur's Liability in Cases of Unknown Cause of Damage in International Air Law - Part I, 
27 J. AIR L. & COM. 1 (1960); Comment, The Warsaw Treaty: The Quid Pro Quo, 29 U. PITT. L. REv. 253 
(1967). 
With the passage of the Montreal Agreement in 1966, the carrier was forced to waive its Article 20( 1) 
defenses and agree to be strictly liable for all carriage-related injuries occurring on flights stopping in 
the United States. See infra notes 80-83 and accompanying text. 
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passenger was the "willful misconduct" exception of Article 25,37 which elimi-
nated the benefits of the Warsaw Convention's liability limitation if the passenger 
could establish that the accident and damage arose out of the willful misconduct 
of the carrier or its agents.38 Thus, a passenger was entitled to potentially 
unlimited recovery if the passenger could prove willful misconduct on behalf of 
the air carrier. 
B. The Hague Protocol 
As the aviation industry grew more stable and profitable, and as travel became 
much safer,39 it began to appear that the special protection afforded to the 
international air carriers by the Warsaw Convention's low liability limitations was 
no longer justifiable.40 Furthermore, recoveries in domestic aviation accidents in 
developed nations, such as France, Great Britain, and the United States, far 
exceeded the recovery amounts permitted by the Warsaw Convention in interna-
tional aviation accidents.41 To address these developments, particularly the large 
discrepancy in recoveries for passenger death or injury between domestic and 
international air accidents, an international conference was assembled at The 
Hague in 1955 to amend the Warsaw Convention.42 
At the Hague Conference, the United States became the leading proponent 
for a significantly higher liability limit.43 U.S. delegates originally sought to raise 
the liability limitation from $8300, under the Warsaw Convention, to $25,000.44 
Delegates from other nations opposed such an increase,45 however, and the U.S. 
37. Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention reads: 
(1) The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of tlte provisions of tltis convention which 
exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his wilful misconduct or by such default 
on his part as, in accordance with the law of the court to which the case is submitted, is 
considered to be equivalent to wilful misconduct. 
(2) Similarly the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the said provisions, if the 
damage is caused under tlte same circumstances by any agent of the carrier acting within the 
scope of his employment. 
Warsaw Convention, supra note 17, art. 25 (emphasis added). 
38. Lowenfeld Be Mendelsohn, supra note 15, at 503. 
39. One court, observing that the airline industry was no longer in its infancy, stated, "[t)he pioneer-
ing conditions and the lack of technical advancement and passenger safeguards which faced the 
industry when Warsaw was adopted have been supplanted by a technologically and commercially 
mature industry." In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia on April 22, 1974,462 F. Supp. 1114, 1125 (C.D. 
Ca\. 1978), rev'd on otiln' grounds 684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982). 
40. Lowenfeld Be Mendelsohn, supra note 15, at 504. See also A. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAw § 4.1 
(1972). 
41. Loggans, Personal Injury Damages in International Aviation Litigation: The Plaintiff's Perspective, 13 J. 
MAR. L. REv. 541,545 (1980). For a discussion of the tremendous discrepancy between recoveries in 
domestic airline accidents and recoveries in international airline accidents, see infra note 209. 
42. Lowenfeld Be Mendelsohn, supra note 15, at 504-05. 
43. Id. at 506-07. 
44. /d. at 506. 
45. Id. at 506-07. 
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delegates were forced to settle with a compromise $16,600 limit for passenger 
death or injury.46 
The U.S. delegates at The Hague were not entirely satisfied with such a small 
increase in the liability Iimit,47 and only unenthusiastically48 signed in 1956 what 
is known as the Hague Protocol.49 Among the motivating reasons for signing the 
Hague Protocol were the belief of the delegates that it was in the national interest 
of the United States, the largest air-traveling nation in the world, to be a member 
of an international aviation agreement, the belief that it would place U.S. citizens 
and airlines in a better position than they would otherwise occupy in the absence 
of an increased limit, and the belief in the advantages of uniformity in interna-
tional aviation law.50 
The Hague Protocol was submitted to the U.S. Senate in 1959.51 Primarily 
because of objections to its low liability limits, however, the Senate refused to 
ratify the Hague Protocol.52 The $8300 ceiling of the Warsaw Convention con-
tinued to remain in effect in the United States.53 
C. The Montreal Agreement 
The U.S. Senate not only refused to ratify the Hague Protocol, but also began 
to oppose liability limitations of any type.54 U.S. Senators and government 
46. ld. The Hague Protocol exactly doubled the Warsaw Convention liability limit to 250,000 Poincar 
francs, which was worth approximately $16,600.ld. at 507. 
47. Although the increase in the liability limit was unsatisfactory in the minds of many U.S. delegates, 
the delegates were not unmindful of the perceived advantages of the Hague Protocol. These advantages 
included: (I) an assured forum; (2) protection against contractual limits of liability; (3) protection 
against lower limits applying at the place of the accident; and (4) avoidance of the chaos of conflicting 
laws that would be applicable without a treaty. ld. at 510. 
48. ld. at 512. 
49. Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International 
Carriage by Air, opened for signature Sept. 28, 1955,478 U.N.T.S. 371 [hereinafter cited as the Hague 
Protocol). 
As of June 1983, 86 nations had ratified the Hague Protocol, including: Afghanistan, Algeria, 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian S.S.R., Came-
roon, Canada, Chile, China (People's Rep.), Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, 
Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Egypt, EI Salvador, Fiji, France, Gabon, German 
Democratic Republic, Germany (Fed. Rep.), Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Korea, Korean People's Democratic Rep., Kuwait, Laos, 
Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Luxembourg, Malagasy Republic, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Monaco, 
Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, 
Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Singapore, South Africa, 
Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Swaziland, Togo, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., United Arab Republic, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe 
(Notification of Succession). 3 Av. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 27,128 Oune 1983). 
50. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 15, at 514. 
51. ld. at 514-15 (citing SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF 
THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING A CERTIFIED COpy OF THE PROTOCOL, SEN. EXEC. Doc. No. H, 86th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1959». 
52. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 15, at 515-16. 
53. I L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAWS § 12.03(3) (1978). 
54. See generally Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 15, at 515-63. 
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officials began to question the desirability of continued adherence by the United 
States to the Warsaw Convention.55 The President, various legislators, and lead-
ers in the private sector proposed a variety of compromise measures designed to 
make the Convention more palatable to those senators opposed to the liability 
limitations.56 None, however, proved to be acceptable.57 
As pressure mounted against the low liability limits of the Warsaw Convention, 
it appeared increasingly likely that the United States would denounce the War-
saw Convention pursuant to Article 39 of the Convention.58 The United States 
was reluctant to take this move, since denunciation would be a major setback not 
only to the development of uniform international aviation law, but also to 
international cooperation in general.59 However, given the mounting pressures 
caused primarily by the ever-increasing discrepancy between recoveries in 
domestic and international aviation accidents,60 U.S. government officials be-
lieved there was no choice but to give notice of denunciation.61 On November 15, 
1965, the United States deposited its formal Notice of Denunciation of the 
Warsaw Convention with the Polish Government.62 Because the denunciation 
would not become effective until May 15, 1966,63 the United States was able to 
55. See generally id. Opposition to any type of liability limit was strengthened by a series of airplane 
crashes involving well-known persons in which the Warsaw Convention limited recovery to what was 
considered to be an unconscionably low amount.ld. at 515. See, e.g., Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air 
France, 229 F. Supp. 801 (N.D. Ga. 1964) (Atlanta Art Association members killed on takeoff at Paris on 
june 3, 1962; Warsaw Convention limited damages to $8300); Kelley v. Societe Anonyme Beige 
d'Exploitation de la Navigation Aerienne (SABENA), 242 F. Supp. 129 (E.D.N.Y. 1965) (U.S. Olympic 
Skating Team killed in aircrash near Brussels on Feb. 15, 1961; Warsaw Convention limited damages to 
$8300); Capehart v. Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. (AVIANCA), Civil No. 10,315 (E.D. Fla. 
1963) (son and daughter-in-law of U.S. Senator Homer Capehart of Indiana killed in crash landing at 
Montego Bay, jamaica, on jan. 21, 1960; damages eventually exceeded Warsaw limit only because of a 
willful misconduct finding under Article 25 of the Convention). 
56. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 15, at 532-46. 
57. See id. 
58. See id. at 546-52. Article 39 of the Warsaw Convention reads: 
(I) Anyone of the High Contracting Parties may denounce this convention by a notification 
addressed to the Government of the Republic of Poland, which shall at once inform the 
Government of each of the High Contracting Parties. 
(2) Denunciation shall take effect six months after the notification of denunciation, and shall 
operate only as regards the party which shall have proceeded to denunciation. 
Warsaw Convention, supra note 17, art. 39. 
59. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 15, at 534, 548-49. 
60. ld. at 553 (citing Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) charts showing: "(1) the average recovery 
between 1950 and 1964 for a fatality on a Warsaw [international) case was $6489 as compared with a 
$38,499 average recovery on a non-Warsaw [domestic) case; and (2) during the period of 1958-64 the 
average recovery for a fatality on a non-Warsaw case had risen to over $52,000."). 
61. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 15, at 549. 
62. Dep't St. Press Release No. 268, 53 DEP'T ST. BULL. 923 (1965). 
63. See Article 39(2) of the Warsaw Convention, supra note 58, which provides that denunciation will 
not become effective until six months after formal notification of denunciation. 
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offer a glimmer of hope to the remammg proponents64 of international air 
carrier liability law. In a State Department press release announcing the denun-
ciation, the United States suggested that it would withdraw the denunciation 
before its effective date if there were a reasonable prospect of a new interna-
tional agreement on liability limitation in the vicinity of $100,000.65 Given this six 
month deadline, an international conference was convened in Montreal in 1966 
(known as the Montreal Conference) for the purpose of establishing a new 
internationally recognized liability limit.66 At the Montreal Conference, however, 
delegates were unable to agree upon a new liability limit, and the conference 
closed without having established a new agreement.67 
Despite the failure of the Montreal Conference to establish a new liability limit, 
there were still last ditch efforts made to achieve some type of resolution of the 
problem before the effective date of the denunciation.68 With the effective date 
imminent, U.S. and foreign officials began to realize more fully the serious 
implications of denunciation by the United States and looked for some possible 
acceptable alternative.69 They found that alternative in a document which has 
come to be known as the Montreal Agreement,70 and the United States formally 
withdrew its denunciation of the Warsaw Convention on May 14, 1966, the day 
before it was to take effect.7I 
64. Both the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Department of Commerce were among 
the most powerful proponents of continued U.S. adherence to the Warsaw system. See Lowenfeld & 
Mendelsohn, supra note 15, at 548. 
65. Dep't St. Press Release No. 268, 53 DEP'T ST. BULL. 923 (1965). In the press release announcing 
the denunciation, the stated reason for the action was dissatisfaction over the Convention's prevailing 
low limits on liability for passenger injury and death. Id. The press release further provided: 
The United States would be prepared to withdraw the notice of denunciation deposited today 
if prior to its effective date of May 15, 1966, there is a reasonable prospect of an international 
agreement on limits of liability in international air transportation in the area of $100,000 per 
passenger or on uniform rules but without any limit of liability, and if, pending the effective-
ness of such international agreement, there is a provisional arrangement among the principal 
international airlines waiving the limits of liability up to $75,000 per passenger. 
Id. at 924. 
66. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 15, at 563-75. 
67.Id. 
68. See id. at 586-96. 
69. Id. at 587. 
70. Agreement Relating to the Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague 
Protocol, Agreement CAB 18900, approved by CAB Order No. E-23680, May 13, 1966,31 Fed. Reg. 
7302 (1966), reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 1502 app. at 1694-95 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Montreal 
Agreement). The Montreal Agreement is also known as the Montreal Interim Agreement. See, e.g., 
Loggans, supra note 41, at 547. 
71. Dep't St. Press Release No. 111,54 DEP'T ST. BULL. 955,956-57 (1966). On May 13, 1966, the 
United States announced its intention to remain within the framework of the Warsaw Convention. The 
United States also announced that the CAB had approved the Montreal Agreement, an interim 
arrangement submitted by the International Air Transport Association (lATA). Dep't St. Press Release 
No. 110, 54 DEP'T ST. BULL. 955, 955-56 (1966). The United States did not formally withdraw its notice 
of denunciation until the following day, May 14, 1966. Dep't St. Press Release No. 11 1,54 DEP'T ST. 
BULL. 955, 956-57 (1966). 
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Unlike the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol, the Montreal 
Agreement is not an international agreement, but rather a contract between the 
United States and the principal U.S. and foreign international air carriers serv-
ing the United States.72 Moreover, the Montreal Agreement does not replace the 
Warsaw Convention.73 Rather, as a special contract under Article 22(1) of the 
Warsaw Convention,74 it imposes only a few expressly specified changes while 
incorporating all the other remaining provisions of the Convention.75 The prin-
cipal effect of the Montreal Agreement is to raise the liability limit for passenger 
death or injury from $8300 under the Warsaw Convention to $75,000 per 
passenger.76 However, the Montreal Agreement applies only to international 
transportation, as defined in the Warsaw Convention,77 provided that the in-
tended journey includes a point of departure, point of destination, or an agreed 
to stopping place in the United States.78 International transportation that does 
not begin, end, or stop in the United States is not covered under the Montreal 
Agreement.79 
In addition to raising the liability limit to $75,000, the Montreal Agreement 
eliminated the air carrier's "all necessary measures" defense under Article 20( 1) 
of the Warsaw Convention,SO thereby creating absolute or "no-fault" liability.81 It 
72. For a list of all the U.S. and foreign air carriers who have signed the Montreal Agreement, see 3 
Av. L. REp. (CCH) ~ 27,130 (june 1983). KAL is among the foreign carriers who have signed the 
Montreal Agreement. Id. 
A recent change in CAB regulations has required all U.S. and foreign air carriers to become parties to 
the Montreal Agreement as a condition precedent to the issuance of a Foreign Air Carrier Permit under 
§ 402 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1372 (1976 Supp. IV 1980); 48 Fed. Reg. at 8049 
(1983) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 211). The rule change was adopted to eliminate the possibility that 
certain carriers under deregulation might not voluntarily comply with the Montreal Agreement. 48 
Fed. Reg. at 8049. Thus, under this rule change, carriers that have operating authority from the CAB 
or operate in international air transportation from or to the United States are deemed to have accepted 
the provisions of the Montreal Agreement. Id. 
73. See Lowenfeld II< Mendelsohn, supra note 15, at 597. 
74. The Montreal Agreement expressly states that it is a special contract under Article 22( 1) of the 
Warsaw Convention. Montreal Agreement,supra note 70, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302. For the full text of Article 
22, see supra note 25. 
75. Lowenfeld II< Mendelsohn, supra note 15, at 597. 
76. Id. The Montreal Agreement provides, in pertinent part, that the "limit of liability for each 
passenger for death, wounding, or other bodily injury [is] $75,000 inclusive of legal fees ... and costs." 
Montreal Agreement, supra note 70, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302. The Agreement also provides that recovery is 
limited to $58,000, if legal fees and costs are excluded. Id. 
77. See supra note 22. 
78. Montreal Agreement, supra note 70, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302. 
79. See id. The Montreal Agreement specifically provides that its "limitations shall be applicable to 
international transportation by the carrier as defined in the Convention or [Hague] Protocol which 
includes a point in the United States as a point of origin, point of destination, or agreed stopping place." 
!d. See also supra note 22 (Warsaw Convention's definition of international transportation under Article 
1(2». 
80. Article 20( 1) of the Warsaw Convention allowed the air carrier to avoid liability upon a showing 
that it took all necessary measures to avoid damages, or that such measures were impossible to 
undertake. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. 
8!. See Montreal Agreement, supra note 70, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302. The Montreal Agreement states that 
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was believed that the establishment of no-fault liability would expedite and 
maximize recovery to the plaintiffs who needed it most.82 Furthermore, long and 
costly lawsuits would likely be avoided in most cases.83 
Although the Montreal Agreement established absolute liability, it did not 
establish an absolute ceiling on recovery. Since the Montreal Agreement incor-
porates all unamended provisions of the Warsaw Convention,84 the willful mis-
conduct exception of Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention remains applicable.B5 
The burden of proof, however, still rests upon the plaintiff seeking unlimited 
damages.86 Thus, if the plaintiff can prove the carrier guilty of willful miscon-
duct, recovery could exceed the $75,000 liability limit imposed by the Montreal 
Agreement. 
The Warsaw Convention, as modified by the Montreal Agreement, controlled 
the liability of all international air carriers flying in the United States87 and, as 
late as 1982, was considered the current state of the law.88 Shortly thereafter, 
however, certain judicial and legislative developments in the law of international 
air carrier liability began to cast into doubt the enforceability of both the Warsaw 
Convention and the Montreal Agreement in U.S. courts. 
"the Carrier shall not, with respect to any claim arising out of the death, wounding, or other bodily 
injury of a passenger, avail itself of any defense under Article 20( I) of the Convention or the 
Convention as amended by the [Hague] Protocol." [d. The CAB explained this change in a press release 
regarding the Montreal Agreement: "[B]y agreeing to forego certain defenses which they could raise 
under the terms of the Convention, the participating carriers are accepting the principle of absolute 
liability, i.e. liability without fault on the part of the airline." CAB Press Release No. 66-61, 382-6031 
(May 13, 1966) (emphasis added), quoted in Windbourne v. Eastern Airlines, 479 F. Supp. 1130, 1141 
(E.D.N.Y. 1979). Significantly, the waiver of the "all necessary measures" defense of Article 20(1) was 
seen as a quid pro quo for the guarantee to the air carrier that the absolute liability limit would not exceed 
$75,000. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 15, at 590. 
By imposing absolute liability, the Montreal Agreement went one step beyond Article 20(1) and the 
common law doctrine of res ipsa Wquitur. See supra note 36. The air carrier could no longer avail itself of 
Article 20( I), and thus the mere proof that an accident occurred would always lead to a recovery of at 
least $75,000. The only issue necessitating resolution in litigation under the Montreal Agreement was 
whether the air carrier was guilty of willful misconduct, in which case there would be no limit to the 
liability of the air carrier. 
82. 54 DEP'T ST. BULL. 955, 956 (1966). 
83. [d. 
84. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. 
85. The Montreal Agreement provides, "nothing therein shall be deemed to affect the rights and 
liabilities of the Carrier with regard to any claim brought by, on behalf of, or in respect of any person 
who has willfully caused damage which results in the death, wounding, or other bodily injury of a 
passenger." Montreal Agreement, supra note 70, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302. 
86. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. 
87. See supra note 72. 
88. See, e.g., O'Rourke v. Eastern Airlines, 553 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) ($75,000 limit on 
liability as provided by the Warsaw Convention, as modified by the Montreal Agreement, is an absolute 
ceiling on liability, and as an international treaty represents the supreme law of the land). 
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III. INTERNATIONAL AIR CARRIER LIABILITY LAW: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 
U.S. COURTS 
A. Judicial Invalidation of the Warsaw Convention 
1. Bali 
In In re Aircrash at Bali, Indonesia on April 22, 1974,89 the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals addressed the constitutionality of limiting claims for compensation 
under the Warsaw Convention.90 Bali consolidated several separate wrongful 
death actions filed by the survivors of passengers killed in the 1974 crash of a Pan 
American World Airways jet in Bali, Indonesia.91 The court suggested that the 
Convention's liability limits may constitute a "taking" without just compensation 
within the meaning of the fifth amendment,92 and therefore may be unconstitu-
tional.93 
The court raised the issue of a "taking" sua sponte, and suggested that compen-
sation may be available under the Tucker Act.94 Citing the concurring and 
dissenting opinion of Justice Powell in Dames & Moore v. Regan,90 the court 
suggested that recovery should be available under the Tucker Act to various 
creditors of the government of Iran if an executive agreement, entered into with 
Iran to secure the release of U.S. hostages, in fact effected a "taking" of the 
creditors' property.96 Stating that "claims for compensation are property inter-
ests that cannot be taken for public use without compensation,"97 the Ninth 
Circuit reasoned that the plaintiffs' wrongful death claims for compensation in 
Bali were no different than the claims of the creditors in Dames & Moore. 98 Thus, 
the court concluded that the Bali plaintiffs' claims were in fact property interests 
89. 684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982). 
90. [d. at 1308-13. 
91. /d. at 1304. 
92. [d. at 1310. Thejust compensation clause of the fifth amendment provides: "[P]rivate property 
[shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CON ST. amend. V. 
93. Bali, 684 F.2d at 1310. The Ninth Circuit, in discussing the issue of a "taking," referred only to 
the Warsaw Convention and not to the Montreal Agreement. See generally id. at 1310-13. To the extent 
that the Montreal Agreement incorporates most provisions of the Warsaw Convention, however, the 
court's analysis applies to the Montreal Agreement as well. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. 
Since the court raised the "taking" issue sua sponte, its failure to refer specifically to the Montreal 
Agreement in this context must be attributed either to oversight or a desire for simplicity, rather than to 
a belief that the liability limit of the Montreal Agreement does not violate the fifth amendment. See 
generally Bali, 684 F.2d 1301 passim. 
94. Bali, 684 F.2d at 1310. 28 U.s.C. § 1491 (1982). The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982), 
provides a cause of action against the U.S. government to persons whose property rights are so severely 
impaired by the excessive exercise of the government's law-making powers that a "taking" is deemed to 
have occurred. Bali, 684 F.2d at 1311 n.7. 
95. 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
96. Bali, 684 F.2d at 1311 (citing Dames & MooTe, 453 U.S. at 690-91 (Powell, j., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part». 
97. Bali, 684 F.2d at 1312. 
98. [d. 
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within the purview of the just compensation clause of the fifth amendment, 
thereby opening the door for a finding that the deprivation of those claims 
constituted an unconstitutional "taking."99 
In determining whether the U.S. government has taken private property for 
which compensation is due under the fifth amendment, a court must decide 
whether any property interests exist at all. loo The Bali court concluded only that 
the plaintiffs' claims were legitimate property interests. lol Recognizing that the 
Court of Claims is the proper forum in which to resolve the issue of whether the 
Warsaw Convention effected a "taking,"102 the Bali court remanded the case to 
the Court of Claims for such determination. lo3 
2. Franklin Mint 
Bali was the first indication that U.S. courts might no longer enforce the 
Warsaw Convention's liability limits. Approximately one monthl04 after Bali was 
decided, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans 
World Airlines,loa determined that the Warsaw Convention's liability limitations, at 
least with respect to cargo, were indeed unenforceable in U.S. courts. lOG The case 
was filed by the Franklin Mint Corporation (Franklin Mint), which had shipped a 
$250,000107 collection of numismatic materials from the United States to En-
gland via Trans World Airlines (TWA).IOB The shipment never arrived, having 
been either lost or destroyed. I09 Although it made no special declaration of value, 
Franklin Mint sought to recover from TWAin excess of the liability limit 
established by the Warsaw Convention for the international transportation of 
cargoYo 
The Second Circuit agreed with Franklin Mint, and concluded that recovery 
could exceed the Warsaw Convention's liability limits.11I The court reasoned that 




102. [d. at 1312, 1315-16. 
103. [d. at 1315-16. 
104. Bali was decided on Aug. 24, 1982. Franklin Mint was decided on Sept. 28, 1982. 
105. 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982), afJ'd 104 S. Ct. 1776 (1984). 
106. [d. at 311. 
107. Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 525 F. Supp. 1288, 1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), modified 
690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982), afJ'd 104 S. Ct. 1776 (1984). 
108. Franklin Mint, 690 F.2d at 304. 
109. [d. 
110. [d. at 304-05. See also Article 22(2) of the Warsaw Convention (limiting liability for international 
transportation of cargo), supra note 25. 
111. Franklin Mint, 690 F.2d at 311. 
112. See supra note 25. 
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terms of "Poincare francs" or French gold,113 had become unenforceable in the 
United States when Congress abandoned the gold standard by. repealing the Par 
Value Modification Act1l4 in 1976.115 The Second Circuit reached this conclusion 
after extensively analyzing the history and treatment of the Article 22 gold clause 
in U.S. and international practice.1I6 
When the Warsaw Convention was drafted, gold was chosen as the official unit 
of conversion in the Article 22 liability clause primarily because of its perceived 
advantages over any particular national currency.1I7 The price of gold was set by 
law in most countries, including the United States,uB In 1945, pursuant to the 
Bretton Woods Agreement,1l9 the United States became a party to the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), which instituted a system of international currency 
exchange that tied each nation's currency to the dollar value of gold at $35 per 
troy ounce.120 A persistent balance-of-payments deficit in the United States in the 
1950s and 1960s, however, led to a massive depletion of the U.S. gold reserves, 
which in turn led to the demise of the gold standard. l2l In 1971, the United 
States reneged its commitment under the Bretton Woods Agreement to convert 
dollars for gold,122 which indicated not only that the "official" U.S. dollar value 
for gold had become purely hypothetical, but also that the use of gold in the IMF 
international currency exchange system was in jeopardy.123 The United States 
devalued the dollar in 1971 by raising the official price of gold to $38 per 
113. See id. 
114. Par Value Modification Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-268, 86 Stat. 116, amt!nded fry Par Value 
Modification Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-110, 87 Stat. 352 (formerly codified at 31 U.S.C. § 449 (1976)), 
repealed fry Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-564. 90 Stat. 2660 (1976) (providing that the repeal of 
the Par Value Modification Act would become effective on April I. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Act of 
Oct. 19. 1976]. 
115. Franklin Mint. 690 F.2d at 311. 
116. !d. at 306-11. 
117. Unlike a particular national currency such as the dollar or pound (which can fluctuate in value 
because of unilateral actions by that particular currency's national government). gold was seen as a 
stable unit of conversion that would ensure judgments of uniform value that tended to reflect real 
values better than currency. Boehringer Mannheim Diagnostics v. Pan American World Airways. 531 F. 
Supp. 344, 350 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (citing Heller. The Warsaw Convention and the "Two TiRT" Gold Market, 7]. 
WORLD TRADE L. 126.129 (1973); Heller. The Value of the Gold Franc - A Different Point of View. 6]. 
MAR. L. & COM. 73.91-92 (1974); Martin. The Price of Gold and the Warsaw Convention, 4 AIR L. 70.71 
(1979)). 
118. In 1934. the United States established an official gold price of $35 per troy ounce. United States 
Gold Reserve Act of 1934. Pub. L. No. 73-87.48 Stat. 337 (1934); Presidential Proclamation No. 2072. 
48 Stat. 1730 (1934). 
119. See Bretton Woods Agreement Act, Pub. L. No. 79-171. § 2. 59 Stat. 512 (1945) (codified at 22 
U.S.C. § 286 (1982)). 
120. Boehringer. 531 F. Supp. at 350. Each nation's currency was assigned a par value that was then 
tied to the dollar value of gold at $35 an ounce. Id. This system was known as the gold standard. 
121. Franklin Mint. 690 F.2d at 307. From 1955 to 1958. U.S. gold reserves decreased in value from 
approximately $24 billion to around $10 billion. [d. 
122. See S. REP. No. 678. 92d Cong .• 2d Sess. 4. reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2209. 
2212. 
123. Boehringer. 531 F. Supp. at 351. 
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ounce,124 and again in 1973 by raising the price to $42.22 per ounce.125 Finally, in 
1976 the United States agreed to abolish the official price of gold altogether by 
ratifying amendments to the Jamaica Accord,126 an IMF agreemt.lt that abol-
ished the concept of an official price of gold. 127 The 43-year link between the 
dollar and gold formally terminated in 1978, when the IMF amendments be-
came effective.128 
With the abolition of the official price of gold, it became unclear what mone-
tary standard to use to determine liability under Article 22 of the Warsaw 
Convention.129 Four alternative units of conversion were suggested: first, the last 
official price of gold in the United States; second, the current free market price 
of gold; third, the Special Drawing Right (SDR), a unit of account of the IMF;130 
124. The United States agreed to the devaluation in December, 1971, but did not pass implementing 
legislation until 1972. See Par Value Modification Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-268, 86 Stat. 116 
(formerly codified at 31 U.S.C. § 449 (1976)). 
125. See Par Value Modification Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-110, § 1,87 Stat. 353 (1973) (formerly 
codified at 31 U.S.C. § 449 (1976)). 
126. The Jamaica Accord was not an international treaty, but rather an endorsement by the Interim 
Committee of the Board of Governors of the IMF of certain proposed changes in the international 
monetary system. These changes were eventually incorporated into the Second Amendment of the 
Articles of Agreement of the IMF, Apr. 30, 1976, [1976-77] 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937. See 
Press Communiqu of the Interim Committee of the Board of Governors of the IMF, Fifth Meeting, 
Kingston, Jamaica, Jan. 7-8, 1976, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 1976 ANNUAL REPORT 
122 (1976) [hereinafter cited as ANNUAL REPORT]. Among the changes endorsed by the Jamaica Accord 
was the abolition of the official price of gold. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra, at 45. 
127. See Act of Oct. 19, 1976, supra note 114. Although Congress repealed the official price of gold in 
general, it permitted its continued use for the limited purpose of determining the value of gold held in 
the form of gold certificates. See 31 U.S.C. § 5117 (1982). The Senate noted that this was the "only 
domestic purpose for which it is necessary to define a fixed relationship between the dollar and gold ... 
. " S. REp. No. 1295, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5950, 
5966-67. 
128. See 22 U.S.C. § 286a app. at 83 (1982). The IMF amendments became effective in the United 
States on April 1, 1978, as provided by the Act of Oct. 19, 1976, supra note 114. 
129. See Franklin Mint, 690 F.2d at 308. 
130. Maschinenfabrik Kern, A.G. V. Northwest Airlines, 562 F. Supp. 232, 238-39 (N.D. Ill. 1983), 
provides an excellent description of the SDR, partially derived from Ward, SDR in Transport Liability 
Conventions: Some Clarifications, 13 J. MAR. L. & COM. 1, 3 (1981): 
The SDR was created by the IMF in 1969 to replace gold and foreign currency in the 
international money reserve markets. IMF banks exchange SDRs for other convertible curren-
cies as though they were lines of credit against which reserves are borrowed for use in central 
banks. Methods of calculating SDRs change over time, but currently are calculated in reference 
to the U.S. dollar, the Deutsche mark, the French franc, the Japanese yen, and the pound 
sterling. The amount of any of the five currencies in one SDR is a function of the percentage 
weights assigned to each currency. The dollar value of one SDR is calculated by adding the 
dollar value of each currency included based on the daily market exchange rate. SDRs tend to 
be less prone to fluctuation than the free market price of gold. This relative stability led the 
Warsaw signatories to propose that the SDR be adopted as the official unit of conversion for 
the Warsaw Convention (Montreal Protocols). 
The proposal that the SDR be adopted as the official unit of conversion for the Warsaw Convention 
was part of the Montreal Protocols, discussed infra notes 208-367 and accompanying text. 
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and fourth, the current value of the modern French franc. l31 
There was widespread dissension and differing practices within the United 
States as to which of the four standards to use. For instance, following the second 
devaluation of the dollar in 1973,132 the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) directed 
the international air carriers serving the United States to set tariffs that reflected 
the new "official" gold price of $42.22 per ounce.133 When the United States 
abandoned its "official" price for gold in 1976,134 however, the CAB took no 
action to revise the limiting tariffs set in 1974.135 Rather, after exhibiting some 
initial confusion as to what the conversion method should be,136 the CAB agreed 
to continue to engage in the "legal fiction" that an official gold price exists in 
order to meet the requirements of the Warsaw Convention.137 This decision, 
under which the CAB directed all airlines to continue to rely upon the last 
official price of gold as the method for determining liability under the Warsaw 
Convention, remains in effect today. 
Courts in the United States were unable to agree upon the proper method for 
determining the liability limitation required by the Warsaw Convention. At least 
three courts followed the CAB's directives and opted for the last official price of 
gold as the correct, albeit artificial, basis for conversion.13B Another court, how-
131. Franklin Mint, 690 F.2d at 305. 
132. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
133. CAB Order 74-1-16, Dkt. 26,274, adopted Jan. 3, 1974,39 Fed. Reg. 1526 (1974). See 14 C.F.R. 
§ 221.38(j) (1981) (requiring air carriers to increase the dollar-based liability limits in their tariffs to 
$9.07 per pound of cargo). 
134. See supra notes 127-128 and accompanying text. 
135. B()(!hringer, 531 F. Supp. at 352. 
136. See id. The CAB's Bureau of Compliance and Consumer Protection suggested in a March 1980 
memorandum that the abolition of the official price of gold removed the legal basis for using the old 
gold-based limits of the Warsaw Convention. Bureau of Consumer Protection, Civil Aeronautics Board, 
Memorandum on Warsaw Convention Liability Limits at 4 (March 18, 1980), as cited in Boehringer, 531 
F. Supp. at 352 n.38. The Bureau withdrew the suggestion a year later in a May 1981 memorandum, 
which advocated that the CAB should continue to use the last official price of gold in observing the 
liability requirements of the Warsaw Convention. Bureau of Compliance and Consumer Protection, 
Civil Aeronautics Board, Memorandum on Warsaw Convention Liability Limits at 5 (May 20, 1981), as 
cited in Boehringer, 531 F. Supp. at 352 n.39. 
137. See Bureau of Compliance and Consumer Protection Memorandum of May 20, 1981, supra note 
136. 
138. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland on March 14, 1980, 535 F. Supp. 833 
(E.D.N.Y. 1982), afI'd 705 F.2d 85 (2d CiL), cert. denid 104 S. Ct. 147 (1983) (in determining liability of 
air carrier under Warsaw Convention for airplane crash resulting in deaths of, among others, eight 
American boxers affiliated with the U.S. Amateur Athletic Union Boxing Team, court held that the 
calculation is appropriately made in terms of the last official price of gold ($42.22 per ounce)); 
Maschinenfabrik Kern, A.G. v. Northwest Airlines, 562 F. Supp. 232 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (court recognized 
the last official price of gold in the United States as the basis for con version in determining liability limits 
under the Warsaw Convention); Deere & Co. v. Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, 18 Av. Cas. 
(CCH) 17,178 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (gold standard price of $42.22 per ounce most nearly effectuates the 
intention of the Warsaw Convention). 
In the district court opinion of the Franklin Mint case, the court held the last official price of gold in 
the United States to be the correct basis for calculation. Franklin Mint, 525 F. Supp. at 1289. This 
decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which refused to recognize any calculation method in 
the absence of congressional action. See Franklin Mint, 690 F.2d at 310-12. 
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ever, opted for the free market price of gold method.139 
The inability of various segments of the U.S. government to agree upon an 
appropriate method of conversion was mirrored by a general disagreement 
among various nations of the world in selecting a universally recognized method 
for calculating liability under the Warsaw Convention. Courts in Indial40 and 
Greece141 had chosen the free market price of gold. The SDR had been adopted 
administratively in Britain142 and legislatively in Sweden.143 The Netherlands144 
and Italy145 reached the same result by judicial decree. Only French courts had 
decided that the current French franc was equivalent to the Warsaw Conven-
tion's Poincare franc and should be used as the unit of conversion under the 
Convention.146 
In Franklin Mint, the Second Circuit considered each of the four suggested 
alternatives as a possible replacement for the Poincare franc of the Warsaw 
Convention, yet dismissed each possibility as inadequate.147 In refusing to adopt 
any method of conversion, the court stated: 
While international disarray as to the proper unit of conversion 
under the Convention alone might not disable us from enforcing a 
new unit, such a unit must be selected either through treaty approval 
by the Senate or by legislation passing both Houses of the Congress . 
. . . Substitution of a new term is a political question, unfit for judicial 
resolution. We hold, therefore, that the Convention's limits on liabil-
ity for loss of cargo are unenforceable in United States Courts.148 
139. Boehringer, 531 F. Supp. at 353 (airline's limitation of liability under Warsaw Convention was 
properly determined by reference to the current free market price of gold). 
140. Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Sanghi, Regular Appeal No. 54 of 1977 (Civil Station, Bangalore, 
India, Aug. 11, 1978), reprinted in Brief for Defendant at A265-71, Franklin Mint, 525 F. Supp. 1288. 
141. Zakoupolos v. Olympic Airways Corp., No. 256 of 1974 Ct. of App.; 3d Dept., Athens, Greece 
(Feb. 15, 1974), translated and reprinted in Brief for Defendant at A251-54, Franklin Mint, 525 F. Supp. 
1288. 
142. See The British Carriage by Air (Sterling Equivalents) Order of 1980, Statutory Instrument 
1980 No. 281, effective Mar. 21, 1980, reprinted in Brieffor Defendant at A62-63, Franklin Mint, 525 F. 
Supp. 1288. 
143. See Sweden's Carriage by Air Act (1957), amendment to ch. 9, § 22, effective Apr. 27, 1978, 
translated and reprinted in Brief for Defendant at A57-61, Franklin Mint, 525 F. Supp. 1288. 
144. State of the Netherlands v. Giant Shipping Corp., Rechtspraak van de Week, 30, May, 1981,321 
(Supreme Court of the Netherlands, May 1, 1981), translated and reprinted in Brief for Defendant at 
A64-93, Franklin Mint, 525 F. Supp. 1288. 
145. linee Aerea Italiane v. Riccioli (Rome Civil Court Judgment 609/1979, Nov. 14, 1978), translated 
and reprinted in Brief for Defendant at A95-108, Franklin Mint, 525 F. Supp. 1288. 
146. See, e.g., Chamie v. Egyptair (Cours d'appel Paris, Jan. 31, 1980), translated and reprinted in Brief 
for Defendant at AI71-91, Franklin Mint, 525 F. Supp. 1288; Pakistan Int'l Airlines v. Compagnie Air 
Inter S.A. (Cours d'appel Aix-en-Provence, Oct. 31, 1981), translated and reprinted in Brieffor Defendant 
at AI5t).70, Franklin Mint, 525 F. Supp. 1288. 
147. Franklin Mint, 690 F.2d at 310. 
148. [d. at 311. 
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Thus, the Second Circuit concluded that it was not within the authority of the 
judiciary to select the conversion method for calculating liability under the 
Warsaw Convention.149 Such a decision, the court implied, was solely within the 
province of the executive or legislative branches of the federal government.150 
3. Kimpo 
In Franklin Mint, the Second Circuit addressed only whether the Warsaw 
Convention's liability limits were enforceable with respect to cargo,151 and did not 
rule on whether the limits were enforceable with respect to damages for death or 
personal i~ury to passengers. 152 This question, however, was answered three 
months later by the District Court for the Central District of California in In re 
Aircrash at Kimpo International Airport, Korea on November 18, 1980.153 In Kimpo, the 
survivors of passengers killed in a 1980 crash of a KAL jet near Seoul, Korea, 
filed wrongful death actions against KAL, seeking to recover in excess of the 
$75,000 liability limit established by the Warsaw Convention as modified by the 
Montreal Agreement.154 The Kimpo court supported the decision of the Second 
Circuit in Franklin Mint, and extended the unenforceablility of the Warsaw 
Convention's liability limits to damages for death or personal injury to 
passengers.155 
In adopting the rationale expressed by the Second Circuit in Franklin Mint, 
and in holding that the Warsaw Convention's limits on liability were unenforce-
able, the Kimpo court did not apply the facts of the case to the applicable law of 
international air carrier liability with respect to passenger death or injury.15s The 
Kimpo court did not explain why the rationale of the Second Circuit, which in 
Franklin Mint refused to enforce the Warsaw Convention's liability limits because 
enforcement would require a judicial determination of an appropriate basis of 
conversion to replace gold, should be extended to the Montreal Agreement. It 
ignored the fact that unlike the Warsaw Convention, the Montreal Agreement 
utilizes dollars rather than gold as the basis for its liability limit. It likewise 
ignored the fact that the Montreal Agreement covers liability for death or 
personal injury to passengers, while the Warsaw Convention continues to cover 
damages to or loss of cargo.157 Nevertheless, without resolving the discrepancies 
in facts between the two cases, the Kimpo court concluded that just as the Second 
149. See id. 
150. See id. 
151. Article 22(2) of the Warsaw Convention, supra note 25, limited recovery to 250 Poincare francs 
per kilogram for loss of baggage or cargo. 
152. See Franklin Mint, 690 F.2d 303. 
153. 558 F. Supp. 72 (C.D. Cal. 1983). 
154. [d. 
155. [d. at 74-75. 
156. See id. 
157. See generally Kimpo, 558 F. Supp. 72. 
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Circuit in Franklin Mint had refused to enforce the liability limits with respect to 
cargo, so too should it refuse to enforce the liablity limits with respect to 
passengers .158 
The Bali, Franklin Mint, and Kimpo cases, considered together, cast consider-
able doubt as to the enforceability of the Warsaw Convention and Montreal 
Agreement. It became unclear whether air carriers were indeed subject to 
unlimited liability with respect to passengers and cargo. The U.S. Supreme 
Court granted certiorari in the Franklin Mint case/59 however, and its subsequent 
decision erased any doubts as to the continued viability of the Warsaw Conven-
tion. 
B. Franklin Mint: The Warsaw Convention Reinstated 
1. The Supreme Court Decision 
In Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. ,160 the U.S. Supreme Court 
reinstated the validity of the Warsaw Convention by rejecting the Second Cir-
cuit's declaration that the Warsaw Convention was unenforceable in U.S. 
courtS.161 The Second Circuit, having recognized that Article 22 of the Warsaw 
Convention phrased the liability limitations for cargo in terms of gold,162 had 
earlier concluded that the repeal of the Par Value Modification Act in 1978163 
had rendered the Warsaw Convention unenforceable.164 Thus, the Supreme 
Court in Franklin Mint focused on two discrete issues. First, did the repeal of the 
Par Value Modification Act render the Warsaw Convention's liability limitations 
unenforceable in the United States?165 Second, assuming the continued enfor-
ceability of the Warsaw Convention, what was the appropriate unit of conversion 
to determine the Warsaw Convention's liability limitations?166 
In determining whether the congressional repeal of the Par Value Modifica-
tion Act could be construed as rendering the Warsaw Convention's liability 
limitations unenforceable in the United States, the Supreme Court first recog-
nized the existence of a well-established canon of construction that directs 
"against finding implicit repeal of a treaty in ambiguous congressional action."167 
158. Kimpo, 558 F. Supp. at 74-75. 
159. Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3084-85 (1983). 
160. 104 S. Ct. 1776 (1984). 
161. Franklin Mint, 104 S. Ct. at 1787. Technically, the Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's 
decision, since the Second Circuit's conclusion that the Warsaw Convention was unenforceable was to be 
applied prospectively only. See Franklin Mint, 690 F.2d at 311. 
162. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text. 
163. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
164. Franklin Mint, 690 F.2d at 311. 
165. See Franklin Mint, 104 S. Ct. at 1782-84. 
166. See id. at 1784-87. 
167. [d. at 1783. 
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The Court noted that there was absolutely no reference to the Warsaw Conven-
tion in either the legislative history or text of the act repealing the Par Value 
Modification Act.168 Stating that "[l]egislative silence is not sufficient to abrogate 
a treaty,"169 the Court concluded that the repeal of the Par Value Modification 
Act was entirely unrelated to the Warsaw Convention.170 Thus, the Court ad-
monished, "[t]he repeal of a purely domestic piece of legislation should ... not 
be read as an implicit abrogation of any part of [the Warsaw Convention]."l71 
Next, the Court pointed out that the executive branch supported the con-
tinued enforceability of the Warsaw Convention in the United States.172 Recog-
nizing, however, that Article 39 of the Warsaw Convention173 provided a mecha-
nism for the executive and legislative branches' withdrawal from the Warsaw 
Convention, the Court concluded that it was "unwilling to impute to the political 
branches an intent to abrogate a treaty without following appropriate proce-
dures set out in the Convention itself."174 
Finally, the Court considered whether the Warsaw Convention could be found 
unenforceable under the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus.175 In its brief, petitioner 
Franklin Mint had suggested that the Warsaw Convention was no longer en-
forceable since there had been a substantial change in conditions since its prom-
ulgation.176 The Court rejected this argument, however, stating that only na-
tions, not private persons, could invoke the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus as an 
excuse for terminating treaty obligations.177 Because Franklin Mint was a private 
person, and because the United States continued to uphold the validity of the 
treaty, the Court concluded that the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus did not apply.178 
Thus, the Court concluded that the repeal of the Par Value Modification Act 
did not affect the continued enforceability of the Warsaw Convention in the 
United States,t79 and that "the [cargo liability] limit remains enforceable in 
168. /d. The Court recognized that there was also no reference to the Warsaw Convention in the 





173. See supra note 58. 
174. [d. 
175. The rule of relms sic stantibus ha. been defined as follows: 
An international agreement is subject to the implied condition that a substantial change of a 
temporary or permanent nature, in a state of facts existing at the time when the agreement 
became effective, suspends or terminates, as the case may be, the obligations of the parties 
under the agreement to the extent that the continuation of the state of facts was of such 
importance to the achievement of the objectives of the agreement that the parties would not 
have intended the obligations to be applicable under the changed circumstances. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 153 (1965). 
176. Franklin Mint, 104 S. Ct. at 1783. 
177. [d. 
178. [d. 
179. [d. at 1784. 
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United States courts."IBO Having reached this determination, the Court then 
focused its attention upon selecting the appropriate unit of conversion for 
determining the liability limitations set forth in the Warsaw Convention. 
The Court ruled that the last official price of gold in the United StateslBI was 
the appropriate unit of conversion. IB2 It based this decision on a policy of judicial 
deference to the treaty-making powers of the political branches. The CAB-
sanctioned cargo liability limit of $9.07 per pound,lB3 the Court stated, "rep-
resented an Executive-Branch determination, made pursuant to properly dele-
gated authority, of the appropriate rate for converting the Convention's liability 
limits into United States dollars. We are bound to uphold that determination 
unless we find it to be contrary to law established by domestic legislation or by the 
Convention itself."IB4 
In selecting the last official price of gold as the appropriate unit of conversion, 
the Court was influenced by its belief that such a determination would be 
"sufficiently consistent" with the purposes of the Warsaw Convention and the 
intent of the 'Convention's framers. IBS The use of the last official price of gold, 
the Court wrote, would satisfy several of the Convention's objectives, including 
the continuation of a reasonable liability limitation. lB6 Moreover, its use would 
ensure that a stable, predictable, and reliable limitation would remain in effect. IB7 
The Court also discussed why it declined to adopt the free market price of 
gold as the method for converting the Convention's liability limitations into U.S. 
dollars. Referring to the extreme fluctuations in the price of gold on the interna-
tional market in recent years,lBB the Court stated, "reliance on the gold market 
would entirely fail to provide a stable unit of conversion on which carriers could 
rely,"IB9 Furthermore, referring to the repeal of the Par Value Modification Act 
in the United States and similar acts in other nations, the Court stated, "[t]he 
1978 decision by many of the Convention's signatories to exit from the gold 
market cannot sensibly be construed as a decision to compel every air carrier and 
180. Id. 
181. The last official price of gold, $42.22 per ounce, was established by the Par Value Modification 
Act of 1973. See supra note 114. 
182. Franklin Mint, 104 S. Ct. at 1784. 
183. A liability limit of $9.07 per pound for loss of or damage to cargo had been set by the CAS in 
1974 as the appropriate interpretation of the gold-based liability limitation provisions of Article 22 of 
the Warsaw Convention. See supra note 133. The $9.07 figure was calculated by using the then official 
price of gold, $42.22 per ounce, as the unit of conversion. See id. 
184. Franklin Mint, 104 S. Ct. at 1784. 
185. Id. at 1785. 
186. [d. 
187. [d. The Court did concede that international uniformity, another objective of the Convention, 
might only be achieved in the long run by requiring periodic adjustment of the CAS's dollar-based 
limitation to reflect, among other factors. possible future fluctuations of the value of the U.S. dollar in 
relation to other western currencies. Id. 
188. The Court noted, as an example. that the price of gold ranged from $490 to $850 per ounce in a 
four month period between January and April. 1980. Id. at 1786. 
189. Id. 
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air transport user to enter it."'90 Thus, the Court concluded that a liability limit 
of $9.07 per pound, based upon the last official price of gold in the United 
States, was "not inconsistent with the Convention."'9' 
2. The Stevens Dissent 
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens criticized the majority 
decision in Franklin Mint. '92 He condemned in particular the "freewheeling 
approach" of the Court in adopting the last official price of gold as the appropri-
ate unit of conversion for determining the liability limitations of the Warsaw 
Convention. '93 By adopting this approach, Justice Stevens believed, the Court 
had in effect rewritten the Warsaw Convention. '94 Berating the majority for 
exceeding its authority, Justice Stevens concluded, "[t]he task of revising an 
international treaty is not one that this Court has any authority to perform."'95 
Justice Stevens first analyzed the principles of treaty construction and the 
appropriate role of the judiciary in enforcing treaties. He quoted an 1821 
opinion by Justice Story: 
[T]his Court does not possess any treaty-making power. That power 
belongs by the constitution to another department of the Govern-
ment; and to alter, amend, or add to any treaty, by inserting any 
clause, whether small or great, important or trivial, would be on our 
part an usurpation of power, and not an exercise of judicial function. 
It would be to make, and not to construe a treaty. Neither can this 
Court supply a casus omissus in a treaty, any more than in a law. We 
are to find out the intention of the parties by just rules of interpreta-
tion applied to the subject matter; and having found that, our duty is 
to follow it as far as it goes, and to stop where that stops - whatever 
may be the imperfections or difficulties which it leaves behind. '96 
Next, Justice Stevens launched into an historical analysis of the Warsaw Con-
vention to determine its objectives. International uniformity, he concluded, was 
the "touchstone" of the Convention.197 In order to achieve international uni-
formity, the delegates at Warsaw consciously selected gold as a common standard 
of value.'9s They believed that gold had a relatively constant value. '99 Paper 
190. [d. 
19!. [d. at 1779. 
192. See Franklin Mint, 104 S. Ct. 1776, 1788-98 (Stevens, j., dissenting). 
193. /d. at 1795, 1797 n.9. 
194. [d. at 1788. 
195. [d. at 1798. 
196. [d. at 1789 (quoting The Amiable Isabella, 6 Wheat. 1,71-73 (1821». 
197. [d. at 1789. 
198. See id. at 1790-93. 
199. [d. at 1792. 
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money, on the other hand, was subject to "fluctuating and uncertain value,"20o 
and therefore was expressly rejected by the Convention as a standard of value .201 
Taking into account the plain language of the Warsaw Convention, its legisla-
tive history, and general principles of international law,202 Justice Stevens con-
cluded that the gold standard, no matter how anachronistic it may be,203 was in 
fact the standard of value adopted by the Warsaw Convention.204 He stated, 
"[t]he intention of the Convention simply could not be more manifest."205 Thus, 
reasoning that the Court is "as obliged to apply the standard of value agreed 
upon by the Convention as [it is] obliged to apply the liability limitation,"206 
Justice Stevens concluded that the majority erred in not selecting the free market 
price of gold as the appropriate unit of conversion.207 
IV. INTERNATIONAL AIR CARRIER LIABILITY LAW: THE MONTREAL PROTOCOLS 
A. Background 
In his dissenting opinion in Franklin Mint, Justice Stevens suggested that if the 
premise of the majority were correct that the liability limitation of the Warsaw 
Convention was unworkable, then the only appropriate remedy would be 
amendment of the Convention by the parties.208 In fact, the parties had already 
commenced efforts to update the Warsaw Convention and Montreal Agreement. 
In 1971, having recognized the increasing discrepancies between amounts re-
covered in domestic airline crashes and amounts recovered in international 
airline crashes,209 the U.S. government joined with the international community 
200. /d. 
201. Id. at 1793. 
202. Id. at 1792. 
203. Id. at 1793. 
204. [d. at 1794. 
205. /d. at 1792. 
206. /d. at 1794. 
207. See generally id. at 1788-98.Justice Stevens evaluated the approach of the majority as "different" 
from his own. [d. at 1795. He wrote: 
[d. 
Rather than attempting to ascertain the intent of the Convention and then applying the liability 
limitation thought appropriate by the Convention, the Court considers its function to make 
one up, with the aid of the Civil Aeronautics Board, so long as its "choice" is "sufficiently 
consistent" with the broad "purposes" of the Convention. 
208. Justice Stevens opined that the Court had no choice but to select the free market price of gold as 
the appropriate unit of conversion, even if it would have made the Warsaw Convention's liability 
limitation "unworkable in today's world." [d. at 1798. The appropriate remedy if the Convention 
became unworkable, Justice Stevens concluded, would be amendment by the Convention's parties, not 
revision by the courts. [d. 
209. Two statistical analyses comparing recovery levels in domestic airline accidents with those in 
international airline accidents were reprinted in the Congressional Record during the Senate debate on 
the Montreal Protocols. See charts reprinted in 129 CONGo REc. S2239, S2259 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983). 
These charts, compiled by the Air Transport Association (ATA), graphically depict the discrepancy 
between domestic and international settlements for personal injury and death actions arising out of six 
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In yet another effort to replace the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Pro-
tocol.210 
The Guatemala City Protocol,2l1 a new international treaty designed to amend 
the Warsaw Convention and Hague Protocol, was the first attempt to update the 
law of international air carrier liability.212 Among the many changes set forth in 
the Guatemala City Protocol, the most significant was an increase in the carrier 
liability limit for passenger death or injury to $100,000.213 As a quid pro quo for 
raising the liability limit, however, the Guatemala City Protocol made the ceiling 
absolute by eliminating the willful misconduct clause that had been included in 
the Warsaw Convention, the Hague Protocol, and the Montreal Agreement.214 
In addition, the Guatemala City Protocol, at the insistence of the United States, 
included a provision that would permit individual nations to adopt a domestic 
compensation system to supplement the Protocol's $100,000 passenger liability 
limit.215 
major airline accidents from 1977 to 1983. In one chart, the survivors of passengers killed on domestic 
flights received average recoveries of $198,600, while survivors of passengers killed on international 
flights received average recoveries of only $ 70,900. See chart reprinted in 129 CONGo REC. S2239 (daily ed. 
Mar. 7, 1983). The second chart presents virtually identical statistics: domestic recoveries averaged 
$180,600, while international recoveries averaged only $65,200. See chart reprinted in 129 CONGo REc. 
S2259 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983). In both charts, approximately eighty-five percent of all settlements were 
below $325,000, the amount of recovery that would be available under the Montreal Protocols if ratified 
by the U.S. Senate. See charts reprinted in 129 CONGo REC. S2239, S2259 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983). 
210. The $8300 limit of the Warsaw Convention and the $16,600 limit of the Hague Protocol were 
still the applicable limits in most of the world, since the $75,000 ceiling established by the Montreal 
Agreement applied only to flights departing, arriving, or stopping in the United States. See supra notes 
70-88 and accompanying text. 
211. Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Interna-
tional Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929 as Amended by the Protocol Done at The 
Hague on 28 September 1955, openedfor signature Mar. 8, 1971 [hereinafter cited as the Guatemala City 
Protocol]. 
212. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 98TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON MONTREAL 
AVIATION PROTOCOLS Nos. 3 AND 4, at 3 (Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter cited as Senate Report]. Only 
25 nations are signatories to the Guatemala City Protocol. They are, in alphabetical order: Argentina, 
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, EI Salvador, France, 
Germany, Guatemala, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Spain, Switzer-
land, Trinidad & Tobago, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela. 3 Av. L. REp. (CCH) ~ 
27,1290une 1983). 
213. Senate Report, supra note 212, at 3. This new increased liability limit of the Guatemala City 
Protocol was still based on the Poincare franc. The Guatemala City Protocol also provided for a system 
of no-fault liability, relaxed jurisdictional requirements that would allow U.S. citizens to sue in U.S. 
courts under most circumstances, and a "settlement inducement clause" which would permit courts to 
impose attorney's fees if the carrier did not make a timely settlement offer at least equivalent to the 
ultimate recovery. In addition to increasing the passenger liability limit to approximately $100,000, the 
Guatemala City Protocol also provided for an increase in the cargo liability limit to $1000 per passenger 
(in lieu of the existing $9 per pound). Id. 214. See text of Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention, supra 
note 37. 
215. Senate Report, supra note 212, at 3. Pursuant to this enabling provision, the U.S. government 
and Prudential Insurance Company developed a supplemental compensation plan (SCP) that would 
provide $200,000 per passenger coverage in addition to the approximately $120,000 carrier liability 
limit (adjusted for inflation) provided by the Guatemala City Protocol. The CAB, on July 20, 1977, 
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Following the opening for signature of the Guatemala City Protocol, and 
before the United States could consider ratification, a series of conferences were 
convened in Montreal primarily to consider detailed provisions relating to cargo 
shipments.216 The final conference, known as the Montreal Diplomatic Confer-
ence, was held in September 1975.217 Aware of the demise of the gold standard 
as the basis for world currency conversion, delegates at the 1975 Montreal 
Diplomatic Conference recognized the need to adopt a new method for currency 
conversion.218 Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention, as amended by the Hague 
and Guatemala City Protocols, still based its liability limits in terms of the Poincare 
franc.219 The United States believed this to be an appropriate time to amend the 
Warsaw Convention's liability limits to reflect the recent abandonment of the 
gold standard,220 and persuaded Norway to propose at the Diplomatic Confer-
ence a substitution of the SDR221 for the existing Poincare franc conversion 
clause.222 
The Montreal Conference adopted four separate protocols, which are collec-
tively known as the Montreal Protocols.223 The first three protocols, Montreal 
Nos. 1-3, were limited in practical effect to substituting the SDR for the Poincare 
franc as the unit of conversion for calculating carrier liability for passenger death 
or injury.224 Montreal No. 1225 amended the Warsaw Convention, Montreal No. 
2226 amended the Hague Protocol, and Montreal No. 3227 amended the 
approved this SCP as an inter-carrier agreement, pursuant to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 412, 
49 U.S.C. § 1382 (1976). Senate Report, supra note 212, at 3. 
216. Senate Report, supra note 212, at 3-4. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
Legal Subcommittee conducted negotiations with respect to cargo provisions in Montreal in September 
1972 and October 1974. A Working Group met in Montreal in April 1975 to resolve conflicts between 
the cargo amendments and provisions of the Guatemala City Protocol. The cargo provisions drafted by 
the 1974 ICAO Legal Subcommittee formed the basis for the Montreal Diplomatic Conference, which 
was held in Montreal in September 1975. [d. 
217. [d. at 4. 
218. [d. 
219. See text of Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention, supra note 25. 
220. See supra notes 117-37 and accompanying text (discussing the demise of the gold standard). 
221. See supra note 130. 
222. Senate Report, supra note 212, at 4. 
223. !d. 
224. [d. 
225. Additional Protocol No. 1 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules 
Relating to International Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on Oct. 12, 1929, done at Montreal on Sept. 
25, 1975 [hereinafter cited as Montreal Protocol No.1]. 
226. Additional Protocol No.2 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules 
Relating to International Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on Oct. 12, 1929, as Amended by the 
Protocol done at The Hague on Sept. 28, 1955, done at Montreal on Sept. 25, 1975 [hereinafter cited as 
Montreal Protocol No.2]. 
227. Additional Protocol No.3 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules 
Relating to International Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on Oct. 12, 1929, as Amended by the 
Protocol done at The Hague on Sept. 28,1955, and at Guatemala City on Mar. 8, 1971,done at Montreal 
on Sept. 25, 1975 [hereinafter cited as Montreal Protocol No.3]. 
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Guatemala City Protocol. The fourth protocol, Montreal No. 4,228 contained 
basic amendments to the cargo provisions of the Warsaw Convention, as revised 
by the Hague Protocol, including the substitution of the gold clause with an SDR 
clause.229 
Of the four protocols, only Montreal No.3 and No.4 came before the U.S. 
Senate for ratification.230 Since they incorporated all of the recent Guatemala 
City Protocol rules regarding liability limitations and substituted the SDR for the 
Poincare franc,231 Montreal No.3 and No.4 essentially superseded the Guatemala 
City Protocol.232 Thus, ratification of Montreal Protocol No.3 and No.4 would 
render ratification of the Guatemala City Protocols superfluous and unneces-
sary.233 
Montreal Protocol No.3 and No.4 came before the U.S. Senate for its advice 
and consent in March 1983.234 Initially, several factors suggested that the Pro-
tocols would be easily ratified. First, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had 
endorsed the Protocols by a sixteen to one vote.235 Second, the U.S. Senate had 
not rejected a treaty for over twenty years.236 Furthermore, ratification of the 
Protocols was endorsed by numerous influential persons, including President 
Reagan,237 several previous administrations,238 other present and former gov-
228. Additional Protocol No.4 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules 
Relating to International Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on Oct. 12, 1929, as Amended by the 
Protocol done at The Hague on Sept. 28, 1955, done at Montreal on Sept. 25, 1975 [hereinafter cited as 
Montreal Protocol No.4]. 
229. Senate Report, supra note 212, at 5. 
230. See id. at 4. 
231. Montreal Protocol No.3 contained provisions affecting passengers and their baggage. Montreal 
Protocol No.4 focused primarily on the carriage of cargo. See id. at 4-5. 
232. See id. at 4. 
233. See id. 
234. See generally 129 CONGo REc. S1838-40 (daily ed. Mar. I, 1983); 129 CONGo REc. S2235-62 (daily 
ed. Mar. 7, 1983); 129 CONGo REc. S2270-79 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983). 
235. Senate Report, supra note 212, at 5. On November 17, 1981, the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee voted sixteen to one to report the Montreal Protocols, including the three provisos, 
favorably to the Senate for advice and consent. Only Senator Biden voted against reporting the 
Protocols to the Senate. The 97th Congress, however, never had the opportunity to consider the 
Protocols, which were one of six treaties left pending at the adjournment of the 97th Congress. Under 
Senate rules the Protocols were automatically re-referred to the Foreign Relations Committee in the 
98th Congress, which by voice vote ordered them favorably reported before the full Senate. This time, 
however, only fourteen members of the Committee asked to be recorded in favor, two were opposed, 
and one voted "present." ld. 
236. See 129 CONGo REc. S2276 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983) (statement of Sen. Kassebaum). 
237. See letter from James A. Baker Ill, Chief of Staff, Assistant to the President, to Sen. Howard H. 
Baker (June 22, 1982), reprinted in 129 CONGo REc. S2238 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983). 
238. See letter from Gerald R. Ford to Sen. Baker (June 16, 1982) (stating support of "the past four 
administrations" for a new treaty amending the Warsaw Convention), reprinted in 129 CONGo REC. S2237 
(daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983). 
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ernment officials,239 the Air Transport Association of America (AT A),240 and 
some of the media.241 Despite this support, the Senate heavily contested ratifica-
tion.242 
The Senate debate on the Montreal Protocols highlights the controversy in the 
United States over whether the United States should remain a party to an 
international aviation agreement limiting the liability of carriers on international 
flights. The next section outlines the content of the Montreal Protocols. It is 
followed by an extensive analysis of the Senate debate. 
B. Content of the Montreal Protocols 
The Montreal Protocols, designed to replace the Warsaw Convention, the 
Hague Protocol, the Guatemala City Protocol, and the Montreal Agreement, 
contained five major changes in the law of international air carrier liability. 
First, the Protocols imposed absolute or "no-fault" liability upon the carrier in 
the event of passenger death or personal injury.243 The establishment of no-fault 
liability was the direct consequence of eliminating the "all necessary measures" or 
"due care" defense that was permitted under Article 20 of the Warsaw Conven-
tion.244 Although the Montreal Agreement had provided for a similar arrange-
ment, the Protocols were the first time such a provision had been set forth in a 
multilateral treaty. 
239. See, e.g., Washington Times article by former Secretary of Transportation Brock Adams (Mar. 
7, 1983), reprinted in 129 CONGo REC. S2236-37 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983); letter from former Secretary of 
State Edmund S. Muskie to Sen. Baker Oune 29, 1982), reprinted in 129 CONGo REC. S2237 (daily ed. 
Mar. 7, 1983); letter from former Assistant Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Sen. Robert C. 
Byrd Ouly 2, 1982), reprinted in 129 CONGo REC. S2237-38 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983); letter from Secretary 
of State George P. Shultz to Sen. Baker (Aug. 9, 1982), reprinted in 129 CONGo REC. S2238 (daily ed. Mar. 
7, 1983); letter from former Secretary of Transportation Drew Lewis to Vice President George Bush 
(Mar. 25, 1982), reprinted in 129 CONGo REC. S2238 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983). See also joint letter of 
Secretary of Transportation Elizabeth Hanford Dole and Secretary of State Shultz to Sen. Baker (Mar. 
7, 1983), reprinted in 129 CONGo REc. S2278 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983). 
240. See letter from William J. Burhop, Senior Vice President, Government Affairs, The Air Trans-
port Association of America, to Sen. Charles H. Percy (Feb. 14, 1983), reprinted in 129 CONGo REC. S1840 
(daily ed. Mar. I, 1983). 
241. See, e.g., Treaty Help for Airline p.assengers, Washington Post (Mar. 2, 1983), reprinted in 129 CONGo 
REC. S2235-36 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983); "No Fault"for Air Travelers, Washington Times (Feb. 28,1983), 
reprinted in 129 CONGo REC. 52236 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (newspaper editorial endorsements of the 
Montreal Protocols). Media endorsements, however, were not universal. Some members of the media 
came out against ratification. See, e.g., Keep Airlines Accountable, N.Y. Times (Feb. 23,1983), reprinted in 
129 CONGo REC. S2252 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983). 
242. See generally 129 CONGo REC. S2235-62 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983); 129 CONGo REC. S2270-79 (daily 
ed. Mar. 8, 1983). 
243. See Article 17 and Article 20 of the consolidated text of The Provisions of the Revised Warsaw 
Convention Applicable to the United States in the Event of Ratification of Montreal Protocols 3 and 4 
and Termination of 1929 Version of the Convention, reprinted in Senate Report,supra note 212, at 23-37 
[hereinafter cited as Consolidated Text]. 
244. See text of Article 20 of the Warsaw Convention, supra note 35. Although Article 20 of the 
Consolidated Text permits the air carrier to use the "all necessary measures" defense for damage 
occasioned by delay, it does not permit the use of the defense for personal injury or death. See 
Consolidated Text, supra note 243, at 29. 
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Second, the Protocols provided for an unsurpassable liability limit of 100,000 
SDRs for passenger injury or death,245 1000 SDRs per passenger for loss or 
damage of baggage,246 and 17 SDRs per kilogram for loss, damage, or delay in 
the carriage of cargo.247 The Consolidated Text of the Warsaw Convention as 
amended by the Montreal Protocols states, "[s]uch limits of liability constitute 
maximum limits and may not be exceeded whatever the circumstances which 
gave rise to the liability."248 These provisions manifest the elimination of the 
willful misconduct clause that was contained in Article 25 of the Warsaw Conven-
tion,249 which permitted recoveries to exceed the liability limits upon proof of the 
carrier's "willful misconduct."25o 
Third, the Protocols contained a "settlement inducement clause," which was 
designed to force airlines to settle claims within six months by imposing addi-
tional expenses (court costs and attorney fees) if settlement had not been reached 
within that time period.251 
Fourth, the Protocols would facilitate suits against foreign airlines in the 
United States by permitting an action in the domicile of the passenger (or 
passenger's decedent) if the airline has an "establishment" there.252 
Fifth, the Protocols recognized the right of each participating state, at its 
option, to establish a supplemental compensation plan (SCP)253 within its ter-
ritories that would supplement the recoveries under the Protocols of its citi-
zens.254 
Of the five major changes proposed by the Montreal Protocols, the establish-
ment of no-fault liability and the elimination of the willful misconduct clause 
received the most attention in the U.S. Senate debate.255 The elimination of the 
willful misconduct clause proved to be perhaps the biggest rallying cry of those 
senators opposed to ratification of the Protocols.256 Considerable dissatisfaction, 
however, was also expressed over the establishment of no-fault liability.257 This 
245. See Article 22(I)(a) of the Consolidated Text,supra note 243, at 29.100,000 SDRs in March 1983 
were worth approximately $109,000. 129 CONGo REC. S2239 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. 
Percy). 
246. See Article 22( I)(c) of the Consolidated Text, supra note 243, at 30. 
247. See Article 22(2)(a) of the Consolidated Text, supra note 243, at 30. In the transportation of 
cargo the liability limit may be increased upon agreement of the parties and payment of a supple-
mentary sum, if necessary. This is known as the "special declaration"concept. [d. 
248. See Article 24 of the Consolidated Text, supra note 243, at 32. 
249. Senate Report, supra note 212, at 17 (referring to Articles X and XI of Montreal Protocol No. 
3). 
250. See supra note 37. 
251. See Article 22(3) of the Consolidated Text, supra note 243, at 30. 
252. See Article 28 of the Consolidated Text, supra note 243, at 33-34. 
253. See infra notes 303-07 and accompanying text. 
254. See Article 35A of the Consolidated Text, supra note 243, at 35-36. 
255. See generally 129 CONGo REC. S2235-62 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983); 129 CONGo REC. S2270-79 (daily 
ed. Mar. 8, 1983). 
256. See infra notes 339-45 and accompanying text. 
257. See infra notes 342-45 and accompanying text. 
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dissatisfaction suggests a misunderstanding of the development of the law of 
international air carrier liability within the United States, since no-fault liability 
was not a new concept there.25B In fact, the United States had been operating 
under a system of no-fault liability, as established by the Montreal Agreement, 
for seventeen years.259 The Protocols merely codified no-fault liability in a legiti-
mate multilateral treaty. Thus, the Protocols extended the doctrine of absolute 
liability so that the doctrine would apply to international aviation accident litiga-
tion not only in the United States, but in all nations signatory to the Protocols as 
well.260 
In sum, only three significant changes in applicable U.S. law, which had not 
already been instituted by adopting the Montreal Agreement, would be insti-
tuted by ratifying the Protocols. First, the Protocols would eliminate the willful 
misconduct exception,261 so that recoveries could never exceed the Protocols' 
liability limits. Second, the Protocols would substitute the SDR for the Poincare 
franc as the unit of conversion.262 Third, the Protocols would implement an SCP 
at the option of each signatory nation.263 
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended that the Protocols be 
ratified with three provisos attached.264 The first proviso would prohibit the 
president from depositing the instruments of ratification that would bring the 
Protocols into force until he has determined that an SCP, as reviewed by the 
CAB, adequately and fairly protects the interests of U.S. air travelers.265 The 
second proviso would direct the president to denounce the Protocols if at any 
time he determines, based upon periodic reviews by the CAB, that the SCP no 
longer best serves the interests of U.S. air travelers and that continued adher-
ence to the Protocols by the United States is no longer advisable.266 The third 
proviso would require the U.S. government to continue actively its efforts to 
increase the liability limit provided for in the Protocols and to remain perpetu-
ally dissatisfied with the Protocols' present limits.267 
258. See id. 
259. See Montreal Agreement, supra note 70, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302. 
260. See Senate Report, supra note 212, at 15 (referring to Article VI of Montreal Protocol No.3). 
Insofar as the Montreal Agreement was an executive order of the President of the United States, it 
applied only to air transportation involving the United States. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying 
text. 
261. See supra notes 248-50 and accompanying text. 
262. See supra notes 245-47 and accompanying text. 
263. See supra notes 253-54 and accompanying text. 
264. Senate Report, supra note 212, at 8. See also 129 CONGo REC. S2235 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) 
(statement of Sen. Percy). 
265. Senate Report, supra note 212, at 8. 
266. [d. 
267. [d. 
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C. Senate Debate of the Montreal Protocols 
Of the two Montreal Protocols before the Senate, Protocol No.3, which 
contained provisions affecting airline passengers, received the most attention.268 
It was clearly considered to be the more important of the two protocols, as shown 
by the fact that the Senate extensively debated the pros and cons of the liability 
limits exclusively with respect to passengers.269 Protocol No.4, which contained 
provisions affecting cargo, was not discussed. 
This was the first time that U.S. lawmakers had ever debated the liability limits 
of air carriers on international flights as set forth in an international agree-
ment.270 Therefore, the arguments set forth by both the proponents and oppo-
nents of ratification provide a significant historical record of perceived advan-
tages and disadvantages of continued U.S. participation in an international 
aviation agreement limiting air carrier liability. 
1. Arguments in Favor of Ratification 
Senator Nancy Kassebaum of Kansas was among the most vocal proponents of 
ratification. Summarizing the positive aspects of the Montreal Protocols, Senator 
Kassebaum stated: 
The protocols will guarantee recovery for damages without the need 
to prove fault, specifically including acts of terrorism, war, sabotage, 
hijacking, and natural disasters; assure access to U.S. courts by 
American citizens; assure cash recoveries, in most cases, within 6 
months of an accident rather than years later; reduce legal expenses 
to normal hourly rates rather than 20 to 40 percent of the victims' 
recoveries; mandate annual review of the system by the Civil 
Aeronautics Board and withdrawal by the United States if the system 
proves inadequate; assure automatic increases in liability levels every 
5 years and continued efforts by the U.S. Government to negotiate 
ever higher levels of airline liability; preserve international consen-
sus on a uniform system of compensation which would protect 
Americans worldwide and not leave some citizens to the mercy of 
foreign courts and very low limits on recoveries.271 
Many of the Senators recognized that although the Montreal Protocols were not 
ideal, they were necessary to improve the existing international air transporta-
268. See generally 129 CONGo REC. 52235-62 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983); 129 CONGo REc. 52270-79 (daily 
ed. Mar. 8, 1983). 
269. [d. 
270. The only other time an international agreement limiting the liability of air carriers on interna-
tional flights came before the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent was in 1934, when the Warsaw 
Convention was ratified by voice vote without any debate whatsoever. See 78 CONGo REC. 11,582 (1934). 
271. 129 CONGo REc. 52270 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983) (statement of Sen. Kassebaum). 
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tion system.272 Senator Percy, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, captured these sentiments, stating, "[w]hatever the reservations which 
some Members may feel [about ratifying the Protocols], we are better off doing 
so than remaining with the present system."273 
During the debate, the proponents repeatedly stressed the following eight 
points: 
a. Increase in Liability Limit Necessary and Relevant 
The Senate debate took place when U.S. courts had begun to refuse to enforce 
the liability limits of the Warsaw Convention.274 The proponents of ratification 
believed that legislative action was necessary in order to clarify the growing 
confusion in the law of international air carrier liability.275 They were aware of 
the reasoning of the Second Circuit, which had stated, "a unit [of conversion] 
must be selected either through treaty approval by the Senate or by legislation 
passing both Houses of the Congress."276 Approval by the Senate of the Montreal 
Protocols not only would increase recovery in international aviation accidents, 
but also would cause the adoption of the SDR as the unit of conversion.277 Thus, 
the proponents feared that unless the Senate took action in approving the 
Protocols, thereby adopting the SDR as the unit of conversion, courts in future 
cases would be reluctant to enforce any liability limit at all.278 
The issue raised in Bali whether the Warsaw Convention's liability limitations 
constitute an unconstitutional taking under the fifth amendment would be 
similarly resolved by ratification of the Montreal Protoco!s.279 The new SCP 
272. See, e.g., 129 CONGo REc. S2244 (dail) ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Percy). 
273. 129 CONGo REC. 52235 (daily ed. Mar. '1, 1983). See also the following remarks: 
[The Montreal Protocols) are by no means a perfect solution to the problem of assuring 
adequate compensation for American[s) in international travel, but they are certainly a great 
Improvement over the present system, which benefits only a very few of the most affluent 
citizens at the expense of everyone else. 
129 CONGo REC. S2244 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Percy); 
Contrary to what opponents to ratification may say, the choice we confront is not between the 
Warsaw system and some ideal system fashioned by American lawyers in American courts. It is 
not a question of uniformity but instead is a choice between the present outdated system of 
aCCIdent compensation and a significantly improved system. 
129 CONGo REc. S2260 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Kassebaum). 
274. See, e.g., Bali, 684 F.2d 1301; Franklin Mint, 690 F.2d 303; Kimpo, 558 F. Supp. 72. 
275. For example, Sen. Percy stated: 
The protoc~ls would actually resolve t~e problems raised in the Franklin Mint and Kimpo cases 
by establIshmg a umf?rm, relIable umt of measurement. They would also go a long way in 
easmg the problem raIsed by the court in the Bali case which resulted because of a concern by 
the. court th~t the present system could not be said to provide adequate compensation to 
aCCIdent VIctIms. 
129 CONGo REc. S2277 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983). 
276. Franklin Mint, 690 F.2d at 311. 
277. See, e.g., Article 22 of the Consolidated Text, supra note 243, at 29-31. 
278. See 129 CONGo REc. S2277 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983) (statement of Sen. Percy). 
279. See, e.g., supra notes 89-103 and accompanying text. 
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provision would increase total compensation from $75,000 (under the Montreal 
Agreement) to approximately $309,000.280 This $309,000 recovery ceiling of the 
Montreal Protocols, the proponents of ratification pointed out, would be ade-
quate to fully compensate over eighty-five percent of claimants.281 Therefore, 
recovery would be fairly substantial, and the risk that a U.S. court might refuse 
to enforce the liability limitations of the Montreal Protocols because they consti-
tuted an unconstitutional taking under the fifth amendment would be greatly 
diminished. 
b. International Uniformity in U.S. National Interest 
The proponents stressed the importance of ratification as an indication of U.S. 
leadership in the international aviation community.282 One Reagan Administra-
tion official suggested that ratification by the United States might encourage 
other nations to follow suit.283 This uniformity was considered important in 
order to protect the U.S. traveling public from unconscionably low recoveries 
when forced to litigate abroad.284 In many cases, a U.S. citizen would be unable to 
sue an airline in U.S. courts.285 Without an international treaty such as the 
Montreal Protocols governing the litigation, the U.S. air traveler would be 
subject to the tort laws of the nation where the crash occurred. In such a 
280. The $309,000 figure breaks down into a $109,000 recovery from the carrier and a $200,000 
recovery under the SCPo See supra note 245 (value of 100,000 SDRs in March 1983 is $109,000). See alro 
infra text accompanying notes 304-05 (value of proposed U.S. SCP is $200,000). 
281. See charts reprinted in 129 CONGo REC. S2239, S2259 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983). Since recoveries in 
excess of $309,000 are normally afforded only to persons whose earning potential is high enough to 
expect such a recovery, those fifteen percent who would not be fully compensated by the Protocols and 
the SCP are likely to have other options for recovery at their disposal. See letter from former Secretary 
of State Warren Christopher to Sen. Byrd (july 2, 1982), reprinted in 129 CONGo REc. S2237-38 (daily ed. 
Mar. 7, 1983). For example, wealthy individuals who are killed in airplane crashes are likely to carry 
additional personal insurance or own considerable assets, the benefits of which presumably would be 
passed on to their survivors. See 129 CONGo REC. S2239 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. 
Percy). See also Washington Times editorial (Feb. 28, 1983), reprinted in 129 CONGo REC. S2236 (daily ed. 
Mar. 7, 1983). 
282. See, e.g., 129 CONGo REc. S2235 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Percy); 129 CONGo 
REc. S2245 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Pell); letter from Secretary of State George P. 
Shultz to Sen. Baker (Aug. 9, 1982), reprinted in 129 CONGo REC. S2238 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983); letter 
from Warren Christopher to Sen. Byrd (july 2, 1982), reprinted in 129 CONGo REc. S2237-38 (daily ed. 
Mar. 7, 1983). 
283. See letter from James A. Baker to Sen. Baker (june 22, 1982), reprinted in 129 CONGo REc. S2238 
(daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) ("many other sovereign governments have indicated that their own ratifications 
of [the Montreal Protocols] await U.S. action."). 
284. See, e.g. , 129 CONGo REc. S2260 (daily ed. Mar. 7,1983) (statement of Sen. Kassebaum, referring 
to the Tramontana case, discussed infra note 286). 
285. A U.S. traveler would be unable to obtain jurisdiction in a U.S. forum if, for example, the airline 
ticket was purchased in a foreign country and the airplane crashed on a purely domestic flight within 
that country. 
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situation, the amount of recovery could be far below the level allowed by U.S. 
law.286 
Not all nations have as extensive a recovery system as that provided by U.S. 
common law, the proponents stressed.287 Thus, the proponents attempted to 
discredit as clearly erroneous the argument that tort law in foreign nations is 
equivalent to U.S. tort law.288 Recovery to the U.S. plaintiff who is forced to 
litigate abroad would be limited to $8300 or $16,600, even when litigating in a 
nation that is a signatory to the Warsaw Convention or the Hague Protocol.289 As 
a leader in international air travel, the proponents argued, the United States 
should take the initiative in updating the law by ratifying the Montreal Protocols, 
and then encourage other nations to follow suit.290 
c. Additional Forum Facilitates Litigation 
The Montreal Protocols would offer the survivors of airline crashes an addi-
tional forum in which to bring their claims.291 Under the Protocols, claims may be 
brought in any country in which the passenger is domiciled or resides, or in 
which the carrier has an "establishment."292 Even Senator Strom Thurmond of 
South Carolina, an opponent of ratification, recognized the advantages inherent 
286. The case of Tramontana v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 350 F.2d 468 (D.C. 
Cir. 1965) illustrates such a scenario. In Tramontana, a U.S. Navy airplane, carrying members of the U.S. 
Navy Band on a flight from Buenos Aires to Galeao, Brazil, collided in midair with a Varig Airlines 
plane over Rio de Janeiro. Varig Airlines is a Brazilian corporation with its principal place of business in 
Brazil. Tramontana, 350 F.2d at 469. Brazilian law limited damages to 100,000 Brazilian cruzeiros, which 
was equivalent to approximately $170. !d. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
determined that, under conflict-of-law rules, the Brazilian law must be applied, and therefore affirmed 
a Brazilian court's award of $170 to the wife of an American passenger aboard the U.S. Navy plane. 
Although demonstrating that recoveries can be as low as $170 under a given nation's tort law, the 
Tramontana case is not entirely on point. Brazil was a signatory to the Warsaw Convention, see supra note 
18, but the Convention's liability provisions were not applicable to the facts of the case. The Conven-
tion's coverage is limited in terms to claims by or on behalf of passengers of the carrier against which 
recovery is sought. Tramontana, 350 F.2d at 470 n.5. Since the American traveler killed was a passenger 
on board a U.S. Navy plane, and not a passenger of Varig Airlines, his wife could not sue Varig Airlines 
under the Convention. Therefore, regular Brazilian law applied, which set a maximum recovery ceiling 
of $170. !d. at 469. 
It should be noted that even with the adoption of the Montreal Protocols, the result in Tramontana 
would not be any different were the same accident to occur again. Recovery would still be limited to 
$170. Tramontana illustrates, however, the low level of damages which many nations allow without an 
international agreement pushing those limits higher. 
287. See, e.g., 129 CONGo REC. 52260 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Kassebaum). 
288. See, e.g., 129 CONGo REC. 52277 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983) (statement of Sen. Percy: "[I]n most 
countries of the world the [limit on liability] is $10,000, or $20,000."). 
289. See supra notes 26 (Warsaw Convention) and 46 (Hague Protocol) and accompanying text. 
290. See supra note 282 and accompanying text. 
291. See supra text accompanying note 252. 
292. See id. See also Senate Report, supra note 212, at 5. 
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in an additional possible forum. He pointed out, "[t]his should insure Americans 
access to U.S. courts in almost all cases."293 
d. Protocols Provide For Speedier, Less Costly Settlements 
The Montreal Protocols would provide for the settlement of most cases within 
six months by imposing a penalty of attorney's fees and court costs on a defen-
dant who fails to settle within the prescribed time period.294 With the implemen-
tation of such a settlement inducement plan, the proponents argued, both the 
incentive to make low offers and the delay between the time of filing a claim and 
final recovery would be dramatically reduced.295 
The proponents also stressed that the $309,000 recovery that would be avail-
able under the Protocols as supplemented by the SCp296 was not significantly 
below the typical recovery in recent domestic air crash settlements.297 They 
pointed out that "gouging" by lawyers who charged excessively high fees cut 
significantly into the total recovery received by plaintiffs in many domestic air 
crash cases decided under common tort law.298 Although the Protocols would not 
specifically provide for hourly rates, the proponents argued, they would institute 
a rather routine recovery system of absolute liability and settlement within six 
months, and therefore contingent fee arrangements by plaintiffs' lawyers would 
no longer be necessary.299 Thus, under the Protocols, plaintiffs would recover a 
much greater proportion of the final settlement than would be possible in 
domestic aviation accident cases. As a corollary, plaintiffs' lawyers would recover 
a proportionately smaller percentage. 
e. Other Avenues To Recovery Still Available 
The liability limits imposed by the Montreal Protocols would not preclude 
recovery from other tortfeasors. The Protocols would place limits on only the 
carrier's liability.30o Accordingly, in situations in which several parties were 
293. 129 CONGo REG. S2277 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983) (statement of Sen. Thurmond). 
294. See supra text accompanying note 251. See also Senate Report, supra note 212, at 4-5. 
295. 129 CONGo REG. S2277 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983) (statement of Sen. Thurmond). 
296. See supra note 280 and accompanying text. 
297. See supra note 209. 
298. See, e.g., Warden, Gouging - Lawyers in DC-l 0 Case Charge Family of One Victim $383,244, 
CHI. LAW. (Feb. 1981), reprinted in 129 CONGo REG. S2240-41 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983); What Lawyers Did to 
"Earn" Huge Fees in DC-10 Cases, CHI. LAW. (Feb. 1981), reprinted in 129 CONGo REC. S2241-42 (daily ed. 
Mar. 7, 1983); Warden, Should a Lawyer Mak£$lO,OOO an Hour?, STUDENT LAW. (Apr. 1981), reprinted in 
129 CONGo REG. S2242-43 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983). See also Senate Report, supra note 212, at 7, 12; 129 
CONGo REc. S2240 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Percy: "[high recoveries in some domestic 
accidents] must be discounted substantially by at least one-third to reflect the percentage paid to 
attorneys on a contingent fee basis."). 
299. 129 CONGo REG. S2270 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983) (statement of Sen. Kassebaum). 
300. See Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention, supra note 25. 
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jointly liable for the wrongful death of a passenger in an international aircrash, 
a plaintiff could recover in excess of $309,000.301 The carrier itself would not 
be liable in excess of $309,000.302 
f. Protocols Establish SCP 
The proponents stressed the fact that the Protocols would be adopted with the 
SCP, which would allow recoveries in the United States to exceed the air carrier's 
maximum liability limit of $109,000.303 The SCP, developed by the CAB and 
Prudential Insurance CO.,304 offered not only a $200,000 supplement in case of 
death, but also unlimited medical expenses in case of injury.305 Thus, ratification 
of the Protocols and the subsequent adoption of the SCP by the United States 
would ensure that recovery in international air crash litigation in U.S. courts 
approximates recovery in domestic air accidents. 
A further advantage of the SCP would lie in its flexibility. Under the provisos 
added to the Protocols, the SCP could be incremented at the discretion of the 
president and the CAB.306 Additionally, the president would retain the option to 
denounce the entire treaty should he decide that the SCP no longer satisfactorily 
serves the interests of U.S. air travelers.307 
g. Provisos Provide For Future Efforts to Increase Liability Limits 
The proponents conceded that the liability limits of the Montreal Protocols 
were not ideap08 They believed, however, that the United States would be much 
better off with the Protocols than under the current system.309 They believed that 
the Protocols were not an end in themselves, but rather a means to an end - by 
adopting the significantly increased limits of the Protocols at that time, the 
United States would reap the benefits of the Protocols while at the same time 
30 I. See supra note 280. Sen. Thurmond recognized this possibility, stating: 
[T]he protocols do not in any way limit the amount which may be recovered from a wrongdoer 
other than the carrier. If a passenger or his representative can establish fault on the part of 
another party, such as the manufacturer of the aircraft or the air traffic controller guiding it[s] 
flight, then recovery may be had against that party as well, under the principles generally 
applicable to joint tort feasors. 
129 CONGo REG. S2277 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983). 
302. See supra note 245 and accompanying text. 
303. See id. 
304. Senate Report, supra note 212, at 3. 
305. Id. at 5. The SCP would be funded by a two dollar surcharge on international tickets. /d. This 
version of the SCP was 'originally developed for implementation under the Guatemala City ProtocoL See 
supra note 215. 
306. See supra note 266 and accomp~nying text. 
307. See id. 
308. See, e.g., 129 CONGo REG. S2277 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983) (statement of Sen. Thurmond); 129 
CONGo REG. S2244 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Percy). 
309. See, e.g., 129 CONGo REG. S2277 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983) (statement of Sen. Thurmond); 129 
CONGo REC. S2244 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Percy). 
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actively pursuing even greater limits.310 The provisos would ensure that the U.S. 
government actively pursues such future increases in the liability limits.311 
h. Rejection of Protocols Would Lead to Chaos 
The proponents stressed that ratification of the Protocols was necessary to 
ensure uniformity in the international aviation community. Senator Percy stated, 
"[f1ailure to approve [the Protocols] would not only forego an opportunity to 
make significant improvements in the present system of accident compensation, 
but would undermine our influence in the international aviation system and 
make future improvements in that system even harder to obtain."312 Senator 
Kassebaum reiterated the parade of horribles that would ensue from a rejection 
of the Protocols, characterizing the current state of international aviation law as 
"enormously complicated, unfair, and deteriorating."313 
Throughout the Senate debate, the proponents of ratification stressed the 
benefits offered by the Protocols. They pointed out that ratification would 
ensure continued international uniformity, substantially increased liability lim-
itations, and increased ease of litigation. Not all the senators agreed that such 
benefits would result, however. In fact, the opponents of ratification found a 
great deal to criticize in the Protocols. 
2. Arguments Against Ratification 
Senator Ernest Hollings of South Carolina led the opponents of ratification of 
the Montreal Protocols in the Senate debate.314 Repeatedly criticizing the no-
fault provisions of the Protocols315 while extolling the virtues of the U.S. tort law 
principle that each person should be compensated according to the damage or 
harm suffered,316 Senator Hollings advised: 
The defeat of these treaties is necessary to insure the right of every 
American to secure adequate and just compensation for personal 
310. See, e.g., 129 CONGo REC. S2277 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983) (statement of Sen. Thurmond); 129 
CONGo REC. S2244 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Percy). 
311. See supra note 267 and accompanying text. 
312. 129 CONGo REc. S2235 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Percy). 
313. 129 CONGo REc. S2271 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983) (statement of Sen. Kassebaum). 
314. Sen. Hollings was himself a former trial lawyer. See 129 CONGo REC. S2246 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 
1983) (statement of Sen. Hollings: "Proudly, I am from the trial lawyer discipline .... [I]t is us trial 
lawyers who, over the past years and years and years, have brought care and concern and safety to the 
workplace. Trial lawyers attempt to do the same for the flying public as well."). See also 129 CONGo REC. 
S2248, S2249 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (statements of Sen. Hollings). For an analysis of the Montreal 
Protocols, written by Sen. Hollings after their defeat by the U.S Senate, see Hollings, Defeat of the 
Montreal Protocol" Victory for Airline Passengers, TRIAL, May 1983, at 20. 
315. See, e.g., 129 CONGo REC. S2245, S2246 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (statements of Sen. Hollings). 
316. /d. 
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injuries or death caused by the negligence of an international airline. 
The treaties under consideration strike at the very heart of the 
well-developed U.S. common law principle that a culpable tortfeasor 
be responsible for fully compensating his victim. The treaties, be-
cause they place a strict limit on liability, will do serious harm to the 
high level of safety that we have come to routinely expect from air 
travel. And finally, the treaties impose a costly system of liability 
insurance that is inadequate to meet the needs of today's interna-
tional air traveler and is therefore, no more than a ripoff of the 
flying public.3l7 
During the debate, the opponents repeatedly stressed four points. First, they 
opposed the liability limits of the Protocols. Second, they believed that the 
Protocols' elimination of the willful misconduct exception would lead to de-
creased air safety. Third, they strongly opposed the SCPo Finally, they believed 
that rejection of the Protocols would not decrease U.S. prestige in the interna-
tional aviation community. 
a. Liability Limits Unacceptable 
The opponents rejected the Protocols' liability limit of 100,000 SDRs on two 
grounds. First, they asserted that any liability limit is inconsistent with U.S. tort 
law.318 Second, they argued that if indeed there must be a limit, the 100,000 SDR 
limit was far too low and totally unacceptable.319 
Senator Hollings criticized the Protocols for being inconsistent with U.S. tort 
law.320 He stressed that any liability limit is not in the tradition of the U.S. legal 
system, which guarantees that a tortfeasor fully compensate a victim.321 Any limit 
on the airlines' liability would leave many plaintiffs not fully compensated.322 
Senator Hollings noted that to remedy this, these plaintiffs might sue other 
parties not covered by the liability limits of the Protocols, including the manufac-
turers of the component parts of the airplane or the U.S. government.323 Accord-
ingly, despite the argument advanced by the proponents that the absolute 
liability doctrine, liability limit, and settlement inducement clauses of the Pro-
tocols would encourage speedier settlements and less costly litigation, the Pro-
tocols would, to the contrary, encourage litigation against other potential defen-
dants.324 Therefore, the Protocols would delay rather than expedite settlements. 
317. 129 CONGo REC. S2245 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Hollings). 
318. See infra notes 320-24 and accompanying text. 
319. See infra notes 325-38 and accompanying text. 
320. See, e.g. , 129 CONGo REC. S2245, S2246 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (statements of Sen. Hollings). See 
also 129 CONGo REc. S2261 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. DeConcini). 
321. See supra note 320. 
322. 129 CONGo REc. S2250 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Hollings). 
323. Id. 
324. /d. 
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The opponents viewed the 100,000 SDR limit itself as the second problem 
presented by the liability limits of the Protocols. They attacked these limits on 
several grounds. First, the opponents argued that there would be a tremendous 
disparity between recoveries for airline crashes on domestic flights and for those 
on international flights. They noted that in international air accidents, domestic 
recoveries could far exceed recoveries governed by the Protocols, even between 
passengers on the same flight.325 Senator Hollings openly expressed his skepti-
cism of the accuracy of the AT A's statistics that indicated that only fifteen 
percent of all airline crash settlements are below the amount of recovery pro-
vided by the Protocols.326 He suggested that the statistics were based on incidents 
that were outdated327 or significantly lower than would be typical.328 Senator 
Hollings pointed out that more representative recoveries could be found in the 
1979 DC-lO airplane crash in Chicago, in which the average settlement approx-
imated $436,000.329 
Second, the opponents argued that inflation had rendered the real value of 
the 100,000 SDR liability limit of the Montreal Protocols below the $75,000 limit 
which was established by the Montreal Agreement in 1966.330 The value of 
100,000 SDRs was approximately $109,000 at the time of the Senate debate.331 
325. 129 CONGo REC. S2246 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Hollings). In fact, passengers 
sitting next to each other on the same flight could be treated differently depending on a variety of 
factors. For example, Passenger A could be booked on a flight from Rome to New York, with a stopping 
point in Boston. Passenger B could be on the same flight, but only on the Boston to New York leg. If the 
plane crashes en route from Boston to New York, Passenger A would be considered on an international 
flight and therefore limited in recovery under the Protocols or Convention. Passenger B, on a purely 
domestic flight, would be able to sue without regard to a liability limitation. Thus, it is conceivable that 
B's recovery could far exceed A's, simply because of the requisite liability limitation. 
Sen. Hollings pointed out a real-life example of this situation in the case of the Pan American World 
Airways 727 crash in New Orleans, Louisiana on July 19, 1982, in which all 146 passengers, some of 
whom were flying on "international tickets" that showed previous stops in South America, were killed. 
Sen. Hollings stated: 
Absurdly, had such an accident occurred under the [Montreal Protocols], surviving families of 
the victims flying on domestic tickets could receive compensation commensurate with their loss 
- $1 million or more as the case may be - while families of victims holding international 
tickets would be limited to settlements of less than $109,000 .... 
129 CONGo REc. S2246 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Hollings). 
326. 129 CONGo REC. S2249 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Hollings, apparently referring 
to the eighty-five percent figure supplied by the AT A's statistical analysis, which is summarized supra at 
note 209). 
327. !d. 
328. !d. Sen. Hollings cited the example of the Pan Am World Airways 747 collision with a KLM 747 
at the Tenerife airport in the Canary Islands in 1977.!d. A statistical analysis in the Tenerife crash is set 
forth in a chart reprinted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. Su chart reprinted in 129 CONGo REc. S2239 
(daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983). Sen. Hollings cited authorities who believed that the average settlements arising 
from this incident were comparatively low because many of the passengers killed were elderly. Sen. 
Hollings stated, "[s]ince most of these passengers had few if any dependents and limited economic 
earning potential, the average settlement tended to be unusually low." 129 CONGo REc. S2249 (daily ed. 
Mar. 7, 1983). 
329. 129 CONGo REc. S2249 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Hollings). 
331. Id. 
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Recognizing that $109,000 was worth approximately $59,000 in 1966 dollars, 
which is $16,000 below the limit established by the Montreal Agreement in 1966, 
Senator Hollings argued that "the claimant's right to full compensation for his 
loss have [sic] been greatly diminished."332 Moreover, Senator Lautenberg, also 
opposed to ratification, suggested that the 100,000 SDR limit was arbitrary and 
capricious, and therefore could be struck down as such by a court.333 
Third, Senator Hollings objected to using the SDR as the unit of conversion, 
since the IMF could modify SDR conversion rates and potentially further de-
crease the U.S. dollar value of the SDR.334 Senator Hollings concluded that the 
Senate "must not shift the risk of downward valuations to our potential Amer-
ican claimants."335 
Finally, Senator Hollings suggested that the effect of the recent Bali, Franklin 
Mint, and Kimpo cases, which would have left the airlines open to unlimited 
liability, had caused the airlines to support strongly ratification of the Pro-
tocols.336 Noting that "[p]erhaps the rush to ratify the treaties during the 
lame duck session was with an eye toward the Kimpo decision being handed 
down,"337 Senator Hollings concluded that the limitation was in the interest of 
the airlines, rather than the passengers.338 
b. Elimination of the Willful Misconduct Exception Would Lead to Unsafe Flying 
Conditions 
Senator Hollings vehemently opposed the Montreal Protocols' elimination of 
the willful misconduct exception.339 He believed that such an elimination would 
foster an awareness by the air carriers that their liability could never exceed the 
limits set by the Montreal Protocols, even in the most flagrant cases of wanton 
recklessness.34o This awareness, Senator Hollings feared, might lead to a relaxa-
332. ld. 
333. Sen. Lautenberg stated: 
[Ilt is an arbitrary limit, that has little or no relation to the actual damages of each injured 
person, or the type of conduct of the airline. Our workers compensation schemes have limits 
too, but they are related to the earnings and real losses of the injured worker. There is some 
fairness in that system. Unfortunately, there is little fairness in the protocols' limits. 
129 CONGo REG. S2278 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983). 
334. 129 CONGo REG. S2248 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Hollings). 
335. /d. 
336. 129 CONGo REG. S2250 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Hollings). 
337. ld. 
338. ld. Sen. Hollings suggested that the airlines would receive two subsidies upon ratification of the 
Montreal Protocols. One would be from the passengers, the other from the U.S. government.ld. See also 
infra notes 350-59 and accompanying text (discussing risk-shifting). 
339. 129 CONGo REG. S2246 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Hollings). 
340. /d. Sen. Hollings stated: 
To remove from potential discovery the carelessness - or even recklessness - of airlines, both 
foreign and domestic, is to thwart one of the two primary goals of the American tort system: 
Prevention. To limit the possible recovery of an American family ... is to destroy the other goal 
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tion of safety precautions by the air carriers.341 
It is noteworthy that much of Senator Hollings' attack was directed against the 
no-fault nature of the Montreal Protocols, which would limit recovery even when 
the airline was at fault. 342 In international aviation incidents, the adoption of 
no-fault or absolute liability provisions would benefit the passenger by expedit-
ing settlement, increasing certainty of recovery, and reducing legal expenses, all 
of which would not be possible under a law permitting the carrier to prove its 
"due care."343 The Montreal Agreement, however, had already established no-
fault liability in the United States by eliminating the "due care" defense of the 
carrier.344 In fact, no-fault liability had been applied consistently by U.S. courts 
since the adoption of the Montreal Agreement in 1966, without a noticeable 
decrease in air safety.345 Thus, despite Senator Hollings's assertions, the 
Montreal Protocols' adoption of no-fault liability was not new, and would not in 
any way change the existing law in the United States. 
c. The SCP is Inadequate to Fully Compensate Victims of International Air Accidents 
The opponents of ratification strongly opposed the SCP, which would have 
created a mandatory passenger insurance program adding an additional 
$200,000 to recovery.346 Senator Hollings attacked the SCP proposal as "out-
rageous and ... a monumental ripoff."347 Much of his attack focused on the fact 
[d. 
of out tort system, namely compensation. The Montreal' Protocols are unique in that they 
would nullify both goals simultaneously. 
341. [d. 
342. In the Senate debate, Sen. Hollings confused the concept of "no-fault" liability with the concept 
of "willful misconduct." For example, he stated, "[e]limination of the issue of fault would likewise 
eliminate the incentive on the part of international carriers to improve these safety related areas ... 
[and the fact that the Protocols would not improve safety] is another reason to defeat this nolault 
concept." 129 CONGo REC. S2246 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (emphasis added). The issue of fault, however, 
was eliminated seventeen years before, with no discernible decrease in safety. See infra notes 344-45 and 
accompanying text. The elimination of fault was adopted entirely for the benefit of the passenger. See 
infra note 343 and accompanying text. Elimination of the willful misconduct exception, however, would 
indeed seem only to benefit the air carrier. Thus, while Sen. Hollings repeatedly referred to the 
elimination of fault, he was most likely concerned with the elimination of the willful misconduct 
exception and its effect on safety. 
Sen. Biden of Delaware, also an opponent of ratification, was better able to distinguish between the 
concepts of fault and willful misconduct. He stated, "[i]fthe willful misconduct exception is eliminated, 
examinations into airline fault will be eliminated. And I feel that this would reduce the incentive for 
airlines to be safety conscious." 129 CONGo REc. S2278 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983). 
343. Llwenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 15, at 571, 
344. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text. 
345. See id. Numerous U.S. government agencies, including the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), closely monitor the operation of airlines 
flying in the United States. This system "has led to an unprecedented safety record for air travel" in the 
United States. Senate Report, supra note 212, at 13. 
346. See, e.g., 129 CONGo REC. S2247 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Hollings). 
347. [d. 
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that the cost of insurance with a maximum recovery limit of $200,000 under the 
SCP might exceed four dollars per ticket as a per passenger surcharge, whereas 
the existing insurance cost for unlimited liability on international flights was 
approximately fifty-three cents.348 Recognizing this eight-fold increase in insur-
ance for seemingly less possible maximum recovery, Senator Hollings called the 
SCP "an obnoxious plan."349 
Senators Hollings and Biden were also greatly disturbed by what they believed 
to be a "game of risk-shifting."35o They feared that ratification of the Montreal 
Protocols would result in three distinct groups subsidizing the air carriers: U.S. 
airline passengers, the U.S. government, and manufacturers of aircraft and 
aircraft parts.35 ! The first subsidy would result from the seemingly excessively 
high per passenger surcharge of four dollars to cover the air carriers' increased 
insurance costs for the SCP.352 The second and third subsidies would result from 
the Protocols' limitation of air carrier liability that would leave many plaintiffs 
not fully compensated.353 The senators opposing ratification feared that these 
plaintiffs would seek recovery from other sources in order to become fully 
compensated.354 One such alternative source might be the U.S. government.35S 
Referring to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Bali,356 the opponents believed that 
the adoption of the Montreal Protocols' 100,000 SDR liability limit might still be 
adjudged an unreasonable impairment of a survivor's right to full compensation, 
in which case the U.S. government could be liable under the Tucker Act.3s7 
Another likely target for plaintiffs who were dissatisfied with the Montreal 
Protocols' liability limits might be the manufacturers of aircraft or aircraft 
parts.3SS Thus, the Senate opponents were concerned that the Montreal Pro-
tocols would shift the risk from international airlines, including foreign airlines, 
to U.S. airline passengers, the U.S. government, and aircraft manufacturers.3s9 
Senator Hollings also objected to the fact that, by means of the first and second 
provisos, the Senate would be giving to the president and the CAB "carte 
348. [d. 
349. [d. 
350. 129 CONGo REc. S2278 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983) (statement of Sen. Biden). 
351. /d. 
352. Sen. Hollings stated, "[b]y eliminating the insurance cost to international airlines and requiring 
the passenger to pay a higher fee for a diminished product, our U.S. airline travelers are being forced to 
subsidize the international airlines." 129 CONGo REc. S2247 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983). 
353. 129 CONGo REC. S2250 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Hollings). See also supra notes 
322-23 and accompanying text. 
354. 129 CONGo REc. 52250 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Hollings). 
355. [d. See also 129 CONGo REC. S2278 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983) (statement of Sen. Biden). 
356. [d. 
357. [d. 
358. See, e.g. , 129 CONGo REC. S2250 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Hollings); 129 CONGo 
REC. S2278 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983) (statement of Sen. Biden). 
359. See 129 CONGo REC. S2278 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983) (statement of Sen. Biden). 
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blanche authority"360 to decide whether the SCP was in the public interest. He 
believed that by withholding ratification of the Montreal Protocols, the Senate 
would adequately protect its role as a check against the executive branch, as well 
as benefit U.S. citizens.36' 
d. Rejection Would Not Impair National Prestige Nor is There a Need For International 
Uniformity 
The opponents of ratification rejected both the suggestion that the U.S. 
national interest would be strengthened by ratifying the Protocols, as well as the 
suggestion that non-ratification would undermine U.S. influence in the area of 
international aviation law.362 Senator Hollings suggested that uniform liability 
limits were not in the national interest or in the interest of U.S. citizens, since 
"Americans, with one of the highest standards of living in the world, would be .. 
. forced to settle just claims for less compensation than they would dare settle for 
in the domestic market."363 Furthermore, Senator Hollings believed that foreign 
countries and their airlines, not the United States, would be the ones to benefit 
from the liability limits of the ProtoCO!s.364 
C. Senate Vote on the Montreal Protocols 
On March 8, 1983, the U.S. Senate voted on Montreal Protocols No.3 and No. 
4.365 Fifty senators voted in favor of ratification, forty-two against, and one 
answered "present."366 Since the requisite two-thirds of the senators present did 
not vote in favor of ratification, the Senate rejected the Protocols, thereby leaving 
the international aviation system with respect to air carrier liability in greater 
confusion and disarray than ever. Not until the U.S. Supreme Court handed 
down its Franklin Mint decision thirteen months later did the situation clarify, at 
least in the United States.367 
V. LIABILITY OF KAL UNDER THE WARSAW CONVENTION 
A. Background 
Approximately 160 actions have been filed in U.S. courts by the survivors of 
360. 129 CONGo REc. S2247 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Hollings). 
361. [d. 
362. 129 CONGo REC. S2251 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Hollings). 
363. !d. 
364. Sen. Hollings stated, "[t)here is no embarrassment in rejecting these treaties. On the contrary, 
every Senator should be proud to do so. We were elected to protect America's national interest, not to 
pawn it away." [d. 
365. See 129 CONGo REc. S2279 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983). 
366. !d. 
367. See generally supra text accompanying notes 160-91. 
118 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. VIII, No.1 
passengers killed in the shooting down of KAL Flight 007.368 These actions have 
been consolidated for trial in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colum-
bia.369 Although at the time of the KAL incident the law of international air 
carrier liability was in marked disarray, the confusion disappeared in the United 
States approximately seven months later when the Supreme Court handed down 
its Franklin Mint decision.370 Franklin Mint unequivocally declared that the War-
saw Convention remains enforceable in the United States,371 and therefore the 
Warsaw Convention governs in the typical international air accident trial.372 
The forthcoming KAL Flight 007 litigation does not promise to be a typical 
international air accident trial. Because of the unusual circumstances surround-
ing the case, it is likely that plaintiffs will attempt to circumvent the $75,000 
liability limitation of the Warsaw Convention, as modified by the Montreal 
Agreement.373 In determining whether KAL will in fact be subject to unlimited 
liability, the trial will likely focus on two central issues: first, whether shot-down 
airliners are covered by the Warsaw Convention; and second, whether any 
willful misconduct existed on the part of KAL. This section addresses both 
questions. 
B. Does the Warsaw Convention's Definition of "Accident" Cover Shot-Down Airliners? 
The liability of an airline to its passengers is delineated in Article 17 of the 
Warsaw Convention, which provides that an airline shall be liable for the death 
or injury of a passenger if the accident which caused the damage occurred on 
board the aircraft or in the process of embarking or disembarking.374 Thus, 
Article 17 requires as a condition precedent to liability under the Warsaw 
Convention a determination that an "accident" occurred and that the accident 
proximately caused the injury sustained.375 
368. See In re KAL Disaster of September 1, 1983, M.D.L. No. 565 Mise. 83-0345 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 
17, 1983). 
369. Id. 
370. See generally supra notes 160-91 and accompanying text. 
371. See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text. 
372. See generally supra notes 160-91 and accompanying text. 
373. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
374. Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention reads: 
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a 
passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the 
damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations 
of embarking or disembarking. 
Warsaw Convention, supra note 17. art. 17. 
375. Id. A determination that an "accident" has occurred is also a precondition to liability under the 
Montreal Agreement. As a special contract under the Warsaw Convention. the Montreal Agreement 
incorporates all unamended provisions of the Warsaw Convention. See supra notes 74-75 and accom-
panying text. Since the Montreal Agreement did not amend Article 17. the Warsaw Convention 
requirements still hold. See Montreal Agreement. supra note 70. 31 Fed. Reg. 7302. 
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Unfortunately, the Warsaw Convention does not explicitly define what consti-
tutes an "accident" within the purview of Article 17.376 There are no U.S. cases 
which have addressed the question whether the acts of a sovereign nation third 
party in shooting down an airliner over its airspace constitutes such an accident. 
If the Warsaw Convention is to apply, however, and in order to find KAL 
absolutely liable up to a limit of $75,000 per passenger, then the KAL aerial 
incident must qualify as an accident within the terms of Article 17. 
Courts have defined "accident" on several levels. In a general context, "acci-
dent" has been defined as "an undesigned, sudden and unexpected event,"377 or 
an "unexpected untoward event which happens without intention or design."378 
The idea that an "accident" arises from an abnormality or malfunction in the 
operation of the aircraft was supported by another court, which ruled that an 
injury arising "from ordinary, anticipated and required programmed changes in 
the aircraft's operation, all of which were performed purposefully under the 
careful control of the plane's crew in the normal and prudent course of flight 
control is not [an accident]."379 Thus, these definitions all suggest that an "acci-
dent" is an unusual or unexpected event. 
The shooting down of a civilian airliner would seem to be such an unusual or 
unexpected event. This determination is supported by the few cases which have 
attempted to define the meaning of "accident" under the Warsaw Convention.380 
376. See Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, supra note 374. 
377. Koehring Co. v. American Automobile Insurance, 353 F.2d 993, 996 (7th Cir. 1965). 
378. Ketona Chemical Corp. v. Globe Indemnity Co., 404 F.2d 181, 185 (5th Cir. 1969). 
In the context of the operation of aircraft, one court gave the following jury charge: 
An accident is an event, a physical circumstance, which unexpectedly takes place not according 
to the usual course of things. If the event on board an airplane is an ordinary, expected, and 
usual occurrence, then it cannot be termed an accident. To constitute an accident, the occur-
rence on board the aircraft must be unusual or unexpected, an unusual or unexpected 
happening. 
De Marines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 433 F. Supp. 1047, 1052 (E.D.Pa. 1977), rro'd on other grounds 
580 F.2d 1193 (3d Cir. 1978) (absent evidence that aircraft's repressurization as it descended was 
"unusual or unexpected," there was no "accident" under the Warsaw Convention and the passenger was 
unable to recover for loss of equilibrium and other injuries purportedly caused by such an incident). 
379. Warshaw v. Trans World Airlines, 442 F. Supp. 400, 413 (E.D.Pa. 1977) (routine repressuriza-
tion of cabin of jet aircraft as it descended from high altitude to land, accomplished in normal and usual 
fashion without any complications or external disruptions and in accordance with customarily antici-
pated pre-planned mode, was not an "accident" under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention as modified 
by the Montreal Agreement; passenger therefore could not recover damages for deafness occasioned by 
such repressurization). 
380. See, e.g., Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), afI'd 485 F.2d 
1240 (2d Cir. 1972) (hijacking constitutes "accident" under the Warsaw Convention, and thus airline 
held liable even though identifiable independent acts caused the injury); Karfunkel v. Compagnie 
Nationale Air France, 427 F. Supp. 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (hijacking of airliner constitutes "accident" 
within meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention); Krystal v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 
403 F. Supp. 1322 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (hijacking of airliner was "accident" under the Warsaw Convention); 
People ex rel. Compagnie Air France v. Giliberto, 21 Ill. 2d 90, 383 N.E.2d 977 (1978},cert. denied 441 
U.S. 932 (1979) (hijacking of airplane, and other acts of terrorism committed in course of international 
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Furthermore. the fact that the intentional acts of third parties caused the acci-
dent. and not those ofthe carrier. does not act as a bar to liability of the carrier.381 
Thus. given the fact that hijackings and other acts of international terrorism 
have been held to be "accidents" within the meaning of Article 17.382 and given 
the fact that incidents of less magnitude have been classified as "accidents."383 it 
seems logical to extend the definition of the term "accident" under Article 17 to 
include shot-down airliners. 
The KAL aerial incident apparently constitutes such om "accident" within the 
meaning of Article 17. While flying on an apparently non-military commercial 
flight.384 KAL 007 was shot down by the Soviet Union. Clearly. it was an unusual 
or unexpected event. Therefore. the incident satisfies the definitional require-
ments of Article 17. and may be classified as an "accident." 
Even though the KAL aerial incident may be classified as an "accident" under 
Article 17. such a classification is merely a precondition to imposing liability 
under the Montreal Agreement.385 For the Montreal Agreement to apply. KAL 
must be a signatory and KAL Flight 007 must have originated. terminated. or 
stopped in the United States.386 KAL is a signatory to the Montreal Agree-
ment.387 Furthermore. Flight 007 originated in New York and refueled in An-
chorage.388 Therefore. the Montreal Agreement clearly governs. and KAL 
should be liable up to $75.000 per passenger.389 
C. Did KAL Commit Willful Misconduct? 
The Montreal Agreement preserved the Warsaw Convention's "willful mis-
conduct" exception. which provides for unlimited recovery if the plaintiff can 
flights. are "accidents" within meaning of Warsaw Convention); Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines. 
550 F.2d 152. 154 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc) (terrorist attack on airline passengers constitutes "accident" 
under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention). 
381. S ••••. g .• Busserl. 351 F. Supp. at 707 ("the innocent victims of wilful acts by [third parties] are to 
be able to recover from the carrier. even in respect to acts of sabotage to the aircraft .... It was the final 
intent of the parties [contracting at the Montreal Conference of 1966] to render the carriers liable to the 
innocent victims of such intentional acts [by third parties]."). S •• also Evangelinos v. Trans World 
Airlines. 396 F. Supp. 95. 100 (W.D. Pa. 1975). rlV'd on other grounds. 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977) (en 
banc) (no attempt was made by the Montreal Agreement to limit the application of an "accident" as 
defined in Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention to exclude the criminal act of a third party). 
382. See supra note 380. 
383. See ••. g .• Chutter v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines. 132 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (passenger's 
fall from aircraft after removal of boarding stairs constitutes an "accident"). 
384. Although KAL Flight 007 was apparently a purely civilian commercial flight. the Soviet Union 
has charged that its trespass into Soviet airspace was intentional in order to perform military espionage 
for the U.S. and South Korean governments. S ••••. g .• N.Y. Times, Sept. 17. 1983. § I, at 3. col. 5; N.Y. 
Times. Sept. 6. 1983. § 1. at 1. col. 4. 
385. S •• supra note 375 and accompanying text. 
386. Montreal Agreement, supra note 70, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302. 
387. S •• supra note 72. 
388. See supra note 79 (discussing Montreal Agreement's definition of international transportation). 
389. S •• generally notes 7(}'88 and accompanying text (discussing the Montreal Agreement). 
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establish willful misconduct on the part of the carrier.390 In order to exceed the 
$75,000 recovery limit, therefore, the plaintiff must prove that the accident 
occurred as the result of the willful misconduct of either the airline or its agents. 
Several courts have defined willful misconduct under Article 25 of the Warsaw 
Convention. One court defined it as "the willful performance of an act that is 
likely to result in damage or willful action with a reckless disregard of the 
probable consequences."391 Other courts have required that actual prior knowl-
edge must be found before one may be found liable for willful misconduct.392 
Thus, a determination whether there is willful misconduct in a particular case is 
a question of fact which must be resolved by a jury, using the standard or 
definition of "willful misconduct" in the particular court's jursidiction.393 
Since it is unclear why Flight 007 was straying over Soviet airspace,394 ajury 
would have to take into account the available evidence and the testimony of 
experts in determining whether there was indeed willful misconduct on the part 
of KAL. Such willful misconduct would be found if the jury determined either 
390. See supra note 37 (text of Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention). 
391. Wing Hang Bank v. Japan Air Lines, 367 F. Supp. 94, 96-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (no "willful 
misconduct" present under Warsaw Convention when package, shipped on international flight, contain-
ing $250,000, was stolen from airline's valuable freight storage area, and such storage area was kept 
under guard, monitored via closed circuit television, and had been robbed only once in prior year). 
392. See, e.g., Maschinenfabrik, 562 F. Supp. at 240 (willful misconduct occurs "where an act or 
omission is taken with knowledge that the act will probably result in injury or damage or with reckless 
disregard of the probable consequences"); Saaybe v. Penn Central Transportation, 438 F. Supp. 65, 68 
n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1977) ("willful misconduct" means that the actor desired to bring about the result that 
followed, or at least that the actor was aware that it was substantially certain to ensue); Berner v. British 
Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, 346 F.2d 532, 536 (2d Cir. 1965) (trial court erred in concluding that 
the Second Circuit does not require, for a finding of willful misconduct, knowledge that damage would 
probably result); Pekelis v. Transcontinental & Western Air, 187 F.2d 122, 124 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 341 
U.S. 951 (1951) ("willful misconduct is the intentional performance of an act with knowledge that the 
performance of that act will probably result in injury or damage, or it may be the intentional perfor-
mance of an act in such a manner as to imply reckless disregard of the probable consequences ... [or] 
the intentional omission of some act, with knowledge that such omission will probably result in damage or 
injury, or the intentional omission of some act in a manner from which could be implied reckless 
disregard of the probable consequences of the omission.") (emphasis supplied). 
See also Grey v. American Airlines, 227 F.2d 282, 285 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied 350 U.S. 989 (1956); 
American Airlines v. Ulen, 186 F.2d 529, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1949). 
393. Maschinenfabrik, 562 F. Supp. at 240. 
394. The most reliable method for ascertaining the circumstances under which a fatal passenger 
airplane accident occurred is by reviewing the tapes of the "black box," a recording device positioned in 
the tail section of U.S.-built passenger aircraft. There are actually two "black boxes," one which records 
instrument readings and flight data, the other which records cock pit voice transmissions and conversa-
tions. The black box is designed to withstand the impact of an airplane crash and ocean depths down to 
20,000 feet. The black box emits a "pinging" signal to identify its location, but the water-activated 
batteries which create the "pinging" are not guaranteed to last more than thirty days. See TIME, supra 
note I, at 25; N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1983, § I, at 3, col. 1. 
A massive search effort was conducted in the Sea of Japan for the black box of KAL Flight 007 for 
approximately two months after the crash occurred. The "pinging" signal was heard, but the black box 
was never located. The United States called off its search for the KAL black box on November 5, 1983. 
N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1983, § I, at 8, col. 1. 
t 
122 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. VIII, No.1 
that the pilot flew over Soviet airspace in order to "cut corners" and save time,39s 
or that the KAL jet was on a spy mission and its flight over Soviet territory was 
intentiona1.396 If the plaintiffs can produce evidence showing that the pilots 
failed to re-program the navigational systems, or erroneously entered the wrong 
coordinates,397 then it is less clear whether a jury would find willful misconduct 
under the definitions given above. 
VI. ANALYSIS 
The law of international air carrier liability has been the subject of extensive 
debate and analysis in the United States in recent years. A significant misunder-
standing of the law continues to exist at the highest levels of U.S. government, 
however, as illustrated by both the decision of the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Franklin Mint and by the U.S. Senate debate on the Montreal Pro-
tocols. Therefore, an analysis of these recent judicial and legislative actions is 
appropriate. 
A. Franklin Mint 
The U.S. Constitution provides that treaties of the United States "shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land; and any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any 
State to the Contrary notwithstanding."39s Generally, the Constitution reserves to 
the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government the power to make 
and break treaties.399 This treaty-making power is exclusive, and the judiciary 
lacks authority to abrogate a treaty unless it is either unconstitutional40o or has 
been superseded by subsequently enacted and conflicting legislation.401 Yet in 
Franklin Mint, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals refused to enforce the 
Warsaw Convention, thereby effectively abrogating the treaty.402 While the court 
395. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1983, § I, at 18, col. 1. See also statement by AU'y Melvin Belli, who 
represents the relatives of some of the passengers killed aboard KAL Flight 007. Boston Globe, Dec. 4, 
1983, at A28, col. 1. 
396. Se. supra note 384. 
397. TIME, supra note I, at 25. See also Boston Globe, Dec. 4, 1983, at A28, col. 1. 
398. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
399. U.S. CONST. att. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
400. Doe ex demo Clark v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635,656 (1854). Specifically, the Braden court 
stated: 
ld. 
The treaty is therefore a law made by the proper authority, and the courts of justice have no 
right to annul or disregard any of its provisions, unless they violate the Constitution of the 
United States. It is their duty to interpret it and administer it according to its terms. 
The rule in Braden has been adhered to in subsequent Supreme Court decisions. See Reid v. Covert, 
354 U.S. I, 16-17 (1957); Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 288-89 (1902); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 
258, 267 (1890). 
401. Whitney V. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194-95 (1888). 
402. The Second Circuit in Franklin Mint concluded that the liability limits of the Warsaw Convention 
were prospectively unenforceable in U.S. courts. Franklin Mint, 690 F.2d at 311. 
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believed its deference to Congress to select the appropriate unit of conversion 
for the Warsaw Convention's liability limits was judicial inaction, it was in fact 
judicial action since its effect was to essentially repeal an established multilateral 
treaty.403 
The Supreme Court, in reviewing the Second Circuit's decision in Franklin 
Mint, properly rejected the Second Circuit's ruling that the Warsaw Convention 
was prospectively unenforceable in U.S. courts. It reached this conclusion by 
determining that Congress had not intended to abrogate the Warsaw Conven-
tion by repealing the Par Value Modification Act.404 Absent such superseding 
legislation, therefore, only the political branches of the government, not the 
judiciary, could invalidate an international treaty.405 
B. The Montreal Protocols 
The U.S. Senate's failure to ratify the Montreal Protocols was motivated, in 
significant part, by the belief of many senators that recovery under a system of 
unlimited liability would be far greater than that under the Protocols' system of 
limited liability.406 This belief was fostered by the Second Circuit's decision in 
Franklin Mint, which suggested that the Warsaw Convention's liability limitations 
were no longer enforceable in U.S. courts. What these senators failed to antici-
pate, however, was the subsequent reversal of the Second Circuit's holding by the 
U.S. Supreme Court. In Franklin Mint, the Supreme Court clearly reinstated the 
validity of the Warsaw Convention's liability limitations with respect to both 
cargo and passengers. Thus, in the aftermath of Franklin Mint, plaintiffs in such 
international aviation accidents as the KAL Flight 007 incident would be able to 
recover, at most, $75,000 (unless they could establish willful misconduct). Had 
the Senate ratified the Montreal Protocols, however, such plaintiffs would have 
been eligible to receive up to $309,000. 
In rejecting the Montreal Protocols, the Senate failed to recognize that many 
foreign nations do not have as similarly generous a system of tort law as exists in 
the United States.407 While it is arguably true that in a few instances recovery 
under U.S. tort law might exceed the $309,000 limit that would have been 
provided by the Protocols and SCP, it is not true that recovery by U.S. citizens 
who are forced to litigate in foreign nations will be nearly as great.408 Since the 
United States has not taken the lead in updating international air carrier liability 
law, U.S. air travelers forced to litigate under the domestic law of foreign nations 
403. !d. 
404. Franklin Mint, 104 S. Ct. at 1784. 
405. See supra notes 400-01 and accompanying text. 
406. See generally supra notes 318-38 and accompanying text. 
407. See generally supra notes 286-88 and accompanying text. 
408. See generally id. 
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will in some instances receive absurdly low recoveries.409 Even in those nations 
that still uphold such international air carrier treaties as the Warsaw Convention 
or Hague Protocol, it is unlikely that recovery would exceed $8300, as provided 
by the Warsaw Convention, or $16,600, as provided by the Hague Protocol, 
unless that nation has adopted either the Guatemala City or the Montreal 
Protocols, in which case maximum recoveries would be $100,000 or 100,000 
SDRs, respectively.410 
U.S. citizens constitute the majority of the international air traveling public,411 
and the U.S. government has a responsibility to see that its citizens receive 
adequate compensation for air disasters whether they occur in the United States 
or abroad. One of the principal motivating factors of the U.S. delegates for 
signing the Montreal Protocols was to increase to an acceptable level the recov-
eries that could be obtained by its citizens worldwide.412 While such recoveries 
might not fully compensate the plaintiff, they are larger than recoveries that a 
survivor may receive under less generous tort law systems of other nations. The 
Montreal Protocols also promised to be a starting point for further increases in 
the air carrier liability limit, and not an end in themselves.4!3 Yet the Senate 
failed to ratify them, and in so doing apparently disregarded its responsibilities 
to U.S. citizens who now must litigate abroad or pursue lengthy and expensive 
litigation in U.S. courts. 
The Senate debate of the Montreal Protocols also illustrates confusion by some 
lawmakers with the interpretation of basic legal terms. The Protocols' establish-
ment of no-fault liability was often confused with the elimination of the willful 
misconduct exception.414 Furthermore, some of the cited statistics seem to be 
erroneous. For example, Senator Hollings expressed his disapproval of the SCP 
because of what he believed was a four dollar per passenger surcharge.415 
Admittedly, this would be more than the current cost of unlimited liability 
insurance. Experts in the insurance industry, however, estimate that the actual 
cost would be closer to two dollars per passenger.416 Even if insurance rates were 
to increase, however, such increases could be justified by the fact that the 
Montreal Protocols and SCP together would provide greater recoveries across 
the board for U.S. citizens, and would eliminate lengthy, expensive litigation 
409. See supra note 286 (discussing the Tramontana case). 
410. See, e.g., supra note 245 and accompanying text. 
411. 129 CONGo REC. S2251 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Hollings: "Each year 
Americans constitute over 50% of the international traveling public. Americans annually generate over 
half the revenues that the international airlines receive."). 
412. Senate Report, supra note 212, at 2-3. 
413. See supra notes 264-67 and accompanying text (discussing the provisos attached to the Montreal 
Protocols). See also supra notes 310-11 and accompanying text. 
414. See supra note 342. 
415. See supra notes 348-49 and accompanying text. 
416. Senate Report, supra note 212, at 7. 
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with the adoption of the settlement inducement clause.4t7 Moreover, even a four 
dollar surcharge for the SCP does not seem excessive if it could serve as a 
guarantee of up to $200,000 in case of death and unlimited medical benefits in 
case of injury.418 Thus, the benefits of adopting the Montreal Protocols would 
outweigh the accompanying burdens. 
C. Author's Recommendations 
The KAL Flight 007 incident illustrates the continuing need to update the law 
of international air carrier liability. In litigation arising out of that incident, the 
Warsaw Convention will likely limit KAL's liability to $75,000 per passenger. 
Such unreasonably low recoveries are clearly not in the best interests of either 
the United States or its citizens. To remedy the situation, the United States 
should take two discrete steps. 
First, the U.S. Senate should immediately reconsider ratifying the Montreal 
Protocols in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Franklin Mint. In 
reconsidering ratification, the senators should keep in mind that the Montreal 
Protocols are not an end in themselves, but rather, an interim step in the United 
States' ongoing efforts to increase potential recoveries in international aviation 
accidents, while still remaining a party to an international aviation agreement. 
Second, the United States should take steps to arrange yet another interna-
tional conference on the topic of international air carrier liability. Taking a 
lesson from the March 1983 Senate debate on the Montreal Protocols, the U.S. 
delegates to the new conference should recognize that any new agreement, if it is 
to have a realistic chance of ratification, must contain a liability limitation sig-
nificantly exceeding $100,000, utlizing the SDR or another internationally 
agreed upon unit of conversion, for passenger death or injury. This new agree-
ment should also reinstate the willful misconduct exception clause that was 
eliminated by the Montreal Protocols. 
There is no reason to object to the restoration of the willful misconduct clause. 
There is no longer any need to protect the airlines from potentially debilitating 
lawsuits since the airline industry is no longer fledgling, and since the airlines are 
routinely subjected to unlimited liability in U.S. domestic air crash litigation. 
Furthermore, unlike proving fault, the willful misconduct exception could be 
raised only at the plaintiff's option. A plaintiff unwilling to undergo lengthy 
litigation could settle immediately for a substantial sum. Alternatively, the plain-
tiff who could afford to sit out a lengthy trial might opt to litigate in order to be 
'justly compensated." By restoring the willful misconduct clause, a new interna-
tional aviation agreement would appease those who opposed its elimination in 
the Montreal Protocols on the grounds that its elimination would leave the 
417. See supra note 251 and accompanying text. 
418. See supra note 305 and accompanying text. 
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airlines no incentive to be safety conscious. Thus, restoration of the willful 
misconduct clause would provide substantial recoveries to those in immediate 
need. Moreover, airlines would still be held responsible for their willful miscon-
duct. As a bargaining point at the new conference, the U.S. delegates could 
suggest that the willful misconduct clause apply only to flights entering, leaving, 
or stopping in the United States. This would still cover the vast majority of U.S. 
air travelers, although such a concession would dilute the desired uniformity of 
the new agreement. 
In sum, a new protocol should be drafted, adopting the SDR as a unit of 
conversion, adopting a liability limit significantly exceeding $100,000 in value for 
passenger death or injury, and restoring the willful misconduct exception. The 
only effective difference between the new protocol and the Montreal Protocols, 
therefore, would lie in the increased liability limits and the restoration of the 
willful misconduct clause. A protocol containing all these provisions would likely 
be acceptable to the U.S. Senate. After the Senate ratifies such a protocol, the 
United States could then exert its influence to encourage other nations to follow 
suit. Only then would true uniformity in the law of international air carrier 
liability be restored. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The KAL aerial incident serves as a useful case study by which to examine the 
multi-faceted issues involved in the law of international air carrier liability and 
the inadequacies of the current state of the law. There is a need for a uniform 
standard of air carrier liability on international flights, not to protect the airline 
industry, but rather to protect the U.S. traveling public. Since U.S. citizens 
constitute the majority of passengers on international flights, it is the responsibil-
ity of the U.S. government to take the lead in developing a new international 
agreement. 
While U.S. tort law allows recovery to the extent that a passenger is injured, 
most of the world does not function under a similarly generous legal system. 
Therefore, to protect U.S. citizens traveling abroad from receiving unconsciona-
bly low recoveries, the United States must press for a new international protocol 
modifying the Warsaw Convention. Such a protocol should restore the willful 
misconduct clause and significantly increase liability limits. It should also permit 
nations, at their option, to supplement recoveries with a system of insurance not 
unlike that envisioned by the Montreal Protocols' SCPo Armed with such provi-
sions, the new protocol would guarantee that every plaintiff is compensated to a 
degree not significantly different than in domestic air crash litigation. 
Certainly any limitation of liability is not ideal. An updated international 
agreement with substantially increased liability limitations, however, would be a 
significant improvement over the existing law of international air carrier liability. 
Steven N. Avruch 
